Leniency in Chinese Criminal Law? Everyday Justice in Henan by Liebman, Benjamin L.
LIEBMAN PDF 6/6/2015 3:03 AM
153 
Leniency in Chinese Criminal Law? 
Everyday Justice in Henan
Benjamin L. Liebman 
This Article examines one year of publicly available 
criminal judgments from a basic-level rural county court and 
an intermediate court in Henan Province in order to better 
understand trends in routine criminal adjudication in China. I 
present an account of ordinary criminal justice in China that 
is both familiar and striking: a system that treats serious 
crimes, in particular those affecting State interests, harshly, 
while at the same time acting leniently in routine cases. Most 
significantly, examination of more than five hundred court 
decisions shows the vital role that settlement plays in criminal 
cases in China today. Defendants who agree to compensate 
their victims receive strikingly lighter sentences than those 
who do not. Likewise, settlement plays a role in resolving even 
serious crimes, at times appearing to make the difference 
between life and death for criminal defendants. My account of 
ordinary cases in China contrasts with most Western accounts 
of the Chinese criminal justice system, which focus on 
sensational cases of injustice and the prevalence of harsh 
punishments. 
The evidence I present provides insight into the roles 
being played by the Chinese criminal justice system and the 
functions of courts in that system. This Article also provides 
empirical evidence that contributes to debates on a range of 
other issues, including the relationship of formal law to 
community norms in Chinese criminal justice, the roles of 
witnesses and lawyers, the function of appellate review, and 
how the system confronts and handles a range of high-profile 
topics. My findings also contribute to literature on courts in 
authoritarian regimes and the evolution of authoritarian 
 Robert L. Lieff Professor of Law and Director, Center for Chinese Legal Studies, Columbia Law 
School. BLiebm@law.columbia.edu. 
158
Berkeley Journal of International Law, Vol. 33, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/bjil/vol33/iss1/1
LIEBMAN PDF (DO NOT DELETE) 6/6/2015  3:03 AM 
154 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 33:1 
transparency. This Article provides a base for discussing the 
future of empirical research on Chinese court judgments, 
demonstrating that there is much to learn from the volume of 
cases that have recently become publicly available in China. 
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INTRODUCTION 
English-language scholarship on the Chinese criminal justice system 
largely focuses on major cases and harsh punishments: “strike hard” campaigns, 
capital cases, torture, and sensational cases of wrongful convictions. With few 
exceptions, the term “leniency” rarely factors into Western accounts of criminal 
justice in China. When it does, it is principally in the discussion of national 
policies embracing the combination of leniency and harsh punishment, kuanyan 
xiangji, or leniency for those who confess, rather than empirical study of court 
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practices.1 In contrast, this Article shows that leniency is a key characteristic of 
everyday Chinese criminal justice, particularly in rural areas. 
This Article examines one year of publicly available criminal judgments 
from a basic-level county court and an intermediate court in Henan Province in 
order to better understand criminal justice in rural China and in small towns and 
mid-sized cities of the country. I supplement my analysis of cases with 
interviews of judges, academics, and lawyers in Henan. I have two primary 
goals. The first is to develop an understanding of trends in basic-level criminal 
adjudication in China. I aim to paint a picture of what ordinary crime and 
criminal justice looks like in one county and one municipality2 in China. What 
emerges is an account of ordinary criminal justice in China that is both familiar 
and striking: a system that treats serious crimes, in particular those affecting 
State interests, harshly, while at the same time practicing leniency in more 
routine cases. Most significantly, examination of more than five hundred court 
decisions shows the vital role that settlement plays in Chinese criminal cases 
today. Defendants who agree to compensate their victims receive strikingly 
lighter sentences than those who do not. Whether or not a settlement has been 
reached is far more important to the resolution of a case than more traditional 
legal factors, including legal arguments and evidence presented. Although the 
importance of settlement has been noted in prior Chinese language scholarship, 
no prior work has examined the practice through the study of court dockets or a 
large volume of case decisions.3 My dataset also allows me to examine the role 
of intermediate courts in trying major crimes and in reviewing appeals from 
lower courts.4 Again, the findings are surprising. Appellate courts are far more 
 
 1.  See, e.g., Susan Trevaskes, The Death Penalty in China Today: Kill Fewer, Kill 
Cautiously, 48 ASIAN SURV. 393, 399 (2008) (describing the creation of the “balancing leniency and 
severity” policy). 
 2.  In China the municipality, or shi, is the primary subprovincial governance unit. A 
municipality generally includes both extensive rural areas and county towns, administered by county 
governments, and urban areas, administered by district governments.  
 3.  The most detailed and important prior work in English on the Chinese criminal justice 
system looks at a selection of cases from a range of different courts but does not examine every case 
from any individual jurisdiction. See MIKE MCCONVILLE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CHINA: AN 
EMPIRICAL INQUIRY 40 (2011). 
 4.  China’s court system is divided into four tiers: basic courts at the county (in rural areas) or 
district (in urban areas) level, intermediate courts at the municipality level, provincial high courts, 
and the Supreme People’s Court. The vast majority of cases are tried in basic-level courts, with a 
right to a single appeal to an intermediate court. But serious cases, including criminal cases in which 
a defendant faces a potential death sentence or life imprisonment, are tried in intermediate courts 
with a single appeal to the provincial high court. The State is represented by the procuratorate in 
criminal cases. The procuratorate may appeal verdicts in criminal cases regardless of the outcome in 
the first-instance court; there is no bar to the procuratorate appealing nonguilty verdicts or to arguing 
that a lower court was too lenient toward a defendant. Decisions become final after a decision on 
appeal is issued (or after the time for an appeal has expired). But courts may also decide to retry 
cases at a later date through retrial (zaishen) procedures. Courts also must retry a case if requested to 
do so by the procuratorate. Litigants may request a rehearing within two years of a final decision. 
There is no time limit on rehearings initiated by the courts or procuratorates. In practice this means 
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aggressive in policing lower-court judgments than is commonly assumed. 
Likewise, settlement plays a role in resolving even serious crimes, at times 
appearing to make the difference between life and death for criminal defendants. 
My second goal is methodological. Until recently, Chinese criminal 
judgments were either difficult or impossible to obtain, especially for non-
Chinese researchers. Those who did obtain such opinions largely relied on 
friends and colleagues with connections to local courts. Within the span of just a 
few years this situation has changed dramatically: in Henan Province alone, tens 
of thousands of criminal judgments are now available online. In 2013, China’s 
Supreme People’s Court (SPC) called on courts nationwide to follow the Henan 
example and place most judgments online.5 The reasons behind this sudden 
embrace of transparency are complex (and certainly do not include facilitating 
research by scholars, Chinese or foreign). Nevertheless, the widespread 
availability of large volumes of criminal judgments raises the question of what 
can actually be learned from reading court opinions in China. Chinese and 
Western scholars have generally assumed Chinese criminal judgments tell us 
very little about either the facts or reasoning behind a case. To be sure, much is 
missing from these decisions. The task of reading contemporary criminal 
judgments is at times akin to reading Qing Dynasty cases: readers are left to 
speculate about the facts of the case and behind the scenes interactions among 
the courts, the procuratorate, and the police. Cases are written in a standard 
format and generally emphasize outcomes, not analysis. Certain cases, most 
notably death sentences, remain unavailable and we know little about those that 
are not made public. Nevertheless, this Article demonstrates there is much to 
learn from publicly available cases, including about the role of settlement, the 
types of sentences imposed, the legal arguments made, and the roles of lawyers. 
Even relatively minor and simple case decisions generally provide information 
about the defendant, the crime charged, alleged facts, evidence, lawyer and 
procuratorate attendance and arguments, and outcome, including fines and 
sentences. This Article is the first step toward exploring what scholars can learn 
from the huge volume of material now publicly available. 
The evidence I present provides insight into the roles being played by the 
Chinese criminal justice system, the functions courts play in that system, and the 
meaning of leniency in Chinese criminal practice. My findings also offer a 
baseline for evaluating future changes to the Chinese criminal justice system, in 
particular the effect of the 2012 revisions to the Criminal Procedure Law,6 the 
 
that after the two-year period has run litigants seeking to reopen cases protest or petition to courts or 
procuratorates in an attempt to convince them to initiate rehearings. 
 5.  Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Renmin Fayuan Zai Hulianwang Gongbu Caipan 
Wenshu De Guiding (最高人民法院关于人民法院在互联网公布裁判文书的规定) [Provisions of the 
Supreme People’s Court on the Issuance of Judgments on the Internet by the People’s Courts] 
(promulgated by Sup. People’s Ct., Nov. 21, 2013, effective Jan.1, 2014), available at 
http://www.chinacourt.org/law/detail/2013/11/id/147242.shtml (China).  
 6.  Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingshi Susong Fa (中华人民共和国刑事诉讼法) [Criminal 
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most important development in Chinese criminal justice in two decades, as well 
as the effect of major personnel shifts in the wake of the 2012 leadership 
transition.7 The evidence I present also adds to debates on a range of other 
issues, such as the relationship of formal law to community norms in Chinese 
criminal justice, the role of witnesses and lawyers, and how the criminal justice 
system confronts and handles a range of controversial topics, including land 
disputes, corruption, protests, and disputes within families. 
This Article also contributes to the literature on the evolution of China’s 
courts and courts in authoritarian regimes. The emphasis that courts, 
procuratorates, and police place on settling cases reflects trends in the Chinese 
legal system away from formal adjudication in favor of mediated outcomes. Carl 
Minzner has described such developments as a “turn against law.”8 I have 
written of China’s “return to populist legality.”9 In criminal cases, concerns 
about stability often lead to surprisingly lenient outcomes, at least in routine 
cases. As in high-profile civil disputes—most notably medical, labor, and land 
cases—extreme State emphasis on social stability is leading courts to innovate 
in routine cases. Although judges generally claim they are lenient only where 
formally permitted by law, some cases represent quite flexible interpretations of 
existing law. Courts are most concerned with defending themselves from 
criticism, minimizing conflicts with other State actors, and reducing the risk of 
petitions and protest.10 Such concerns explain both emphasis on settlements and 
deference to procuratorates. Evidence from Henan also contributes to literature 
on the role of transparency in the Chinese legal and political system and in 
authoritarian systems more generally. Henan’s experiment with judicial 
transparency is an example of the ways in which increased public exposure may 
be used primarily to serve the interests of centralized State oversight and 
control. 
In Part I of this Article I discuss Henan’s efforts to make court decisions 
publicly available. In Part II, I present my empirical findings based on 
examination of one year of publicly available criminal division decisions from 
 
Procedure Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 14, 2012), 
available at http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2012-03/17/content_2094354.htm (amending Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo Xingshi Susong Fa (中华人民共和国刑事诉讼法)  [Criminal Procedure Law] 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 17, 1996, effective Jul. 1, 1997), 
available at http://www.oecd.org/site/adboecdanti-corruptioninitiative/46814279.pdf) [hereinafter 
Criminal Procedure Law]. I refer to the 1996 version of the law as the “1996 Criminal Procedure 
Law” and to the 2012 version of the law as the “2012 Criminal Procedure Law.” 
 7.  The leadership transition included the installation of new leaders of the courts, 
procuratorates, and the Communist Party’s Political Legal Committee, which oversees the entire 
legal system.  
 8.  Carl Minzner, China’s Turn Against Law, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 935, 937 (2011). 
 9.  Benjamin Liebman, A Return to Populist Legality: Historical Legacies and Legal Reform, 
in MAO’S INVISIBLE HAND 165 (Elizabeth Perry & Sebastian Heilmann eds., 2011). 
 10.  See generally Benjamin Liebman, A Populist Threat to China’s Courts? in CHINESE 
JUSTICE: CIVIL DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA 269 (Margaret Y. K. Woo & Mary 
E. Gallagher eds., 2011). 
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one county court and one intermediate court. In Part III, I discuss the 
methodological significance of the large amount of data only recently made 
available in China, the implications of my empirical findings for literature on the 
Chinese criminal justice system, and on courts and transparency in authoritarian 
regimes. 
I.  
BACKGROUND: HENAN’S PUSH TOWARD “JUDICIAL TRANSPARENCY” 
Henan Province is home to roughly 100 million people. Located in central 
China and regarded as the historical birthplace of Chinese civilization, Henan 
has lagged behind many eastern and central provinces economically: its per 
capita GDP ranks twenty-first out of thirty-three provincial units in China (not 
including Taiwan).11 Henan is divided into seventeen municipalities, each 
administering populations that range from 1.5 to 8.5 million people. With 61 
million classified as rural, Henan is home to the largest rural population in 
China.12 
Beginning in mid-2009, the Henan High People’s Court ordered all courts 
in the province to begin putting most decisions online.13 Although Chinese law 
provides for most court decisions to be made publicly available, in general they 
are not readily available to nonlitigants. The Henan High Court rule came in the 
wake of Supreme People’s Court (SPC) statements that courts should embrace 
 
 11.  Comparing Chinese Provinces with Countries, THE ECONOMIST, 
http://www.economist.com/content/chinese_equivalents (last visited Oct. 18, 2014). 
 12.  Wang Keya (王克亚), Henan Sheng Nongcun Renkou Liudong Ji Qi Dui Liuchu Di Jingji 
Fazhan De Yingxiang Yanjiu (河南省农村人口流动及其对流出地经济发展的影响研究) [Henan Rural 
Population Flows and Their Economic Development Impact Study], HENAN DAXUE (河南大学) 
[HENAN UNIVERSITY] (2009), available at http://wenku.baidu.com/view/a81c65c22cc58bd63186bd
79.html?re=view.. 
 13.  Related notices stated that the policy was being implemented in order to make the courts 
“more convenient for the people” and to improve “communication with the people.” See Henan 
Fayuan Caipan Wenshu Shangwang Qingkuang Tongbao (河南法院裁判文书上网情况通报 ) 
[Notice on the Situation Concerning Placing Henan Court Judgments on the Internet] (promulgated 
by the Henan High People’s Ct., Nov. 5, 2011), available at http://www.hncourt.org/public/detail.ph
p?id=91015; see also Guanyu Renzhen Zuohao Caipan Wenshu Shangwang Gongzuo de Tongzhi    
(关于认真做好裁判文书上网工作的通知 ) [Notice on How To Diligently Accomplish the 
Work of Publishing Court Judgments on the Internet] (promulgated by the Sanmenxia Ct., May 11, 
2009), available at http://smxzy.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=369; Henan Sheng Gaoji 
Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Yingfa Caipan Wenshu Shangwang Gongbu Guanli Banfa De Tongzhi (河
南省高级人民法院关于印发《裁判文书上网公布管理办法》的通知 ) [Henan 
Provincial High Court’s Notice on Printing and Distributing Court Judgment Publication Online 
Management Measures] (promulgated by the Henan High People’s Ct., Feb. 22, 2010), available at 
http://gsxfy.hncourt.org/public/detail.php?id=356,;%20; Henan Sheng Gaoji Renmin Fayuan Caipan 
Wenshu Shangwang Guanli Shishi Xize (河南省高级人民法院裁判文书上网管理实施细 
则 ) [Implementing Rules of Henan Provincial High Court for the Management of Online Publication 
of Judgments] (promulgated by the Henan High People’s Ct., Aug. 12, 2011), available at 
http://jfqfy.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=569 [hereinafter Implementing Rules]. 
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transparency and place cases online,14 yet Henan’s efforts to post cases went 
beyond what had been done in other provinces and regions up to that point.15 
Other courts had placed cases online selectively, or, in some instances, had 
placed all cases from a specific court division online. In contrast, the 
presumption in Henan is that all cases are to be posted online unless they fall 
within specified exceptions.16 
The official Henan policy is that all court decisions formally classified as 
judgments or verdicts, panjue shu, are to be posted online.17 Documents 
classified as rulings, caiding shu, which are typically brief decisions, are 
required to be posted online only if they fit into one of eight categories, 
generally those involving substantive rulings.18 Exceptions to the general rule 
include cases involving State secrets, personal privacy issues, business secrets, 
crimes committed by juveniles and other cases not publicly tried, capital cases, 
State compensation cases, mediated cases, and withdrawn cases.19 Litigants may 
also request that cases not be posted online or be removed after posting.20 The 
rules state that a court may grant such a request only after “strict review” by a 
supervising judge and only if the case is deemed likely to cause emotional 
distress to a litigant or third party. In practice this is most often done in a broad 
 
 14.  The SPC’s regulation was permissive, not mandatory. It stated in relevant part that “the 
people’s courts may, according to the needs of legal advocacy, law research, case guidance and 
unification of standards for judgment, compile, print and publish various judgment documents in a 
centralized way.” See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Yingfa Guanyu Sifa Gongkai de Liuxiang Guiding He 
Guanyu Renmin Fayuan Jieshou Xinwen Meiti Yulun Jiandu De Ruogan Guiding de Tongzhi 
(最高人民法院印发《关于司法公开的六项规定》和《关于人民法院接受新闻媒体舆论监督的若干规定
》的通知) [Supreme People’s Court’s Notice on the Publication of Six Measures on Judicial 
Openness and Certain Provisions on People’s Court Accepting News Media Supervision] 
(promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Dec. 8, 2009), available at http://www.law-
lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=305059.  
 15.  Some other provinces and municipalities began to emulate the Henan example. 
 16.  In 2013 the SPC issued new rules calling for courts nationwide to place more opinions 
online. See Zuigao Fa Shouci Shangwang Shai”Caipan Wenshu (最高法首次上网”晒”裁判文书) 
[Supreme Law for the First Time Puts Judgment Documents Online], RENMIN RIBAO (人民日报) 
[PEOPLE] (Jul. 3, 2013), http://legal.people.com.cn/n/2013/0703/c42510-22054836.html. 
 17.  Implementing Rules, supra note 13, arts. 3, 5, 6 (stating that “all first instance, appeal, and 
rehearing case opinions shall be posted online” with the exception of specific listed categories of 
cases). 
 18.  The implementing rules list eight categories of such rulings that must be posted online: 
rulings affirming decisions in criminal cases, rulings refusing to accept a case, rulings reflecting 
differing opinions on jurisdiction, rulings directly rejecting suits or rehearing decisions, rulings 
remanding a case for retrial, rulings in cases involving disputes concerning enforcement, rulings 
regarding appeals of enforcement decisions, and rulings correcting typographical errors in opinions. 
Implementing Rules, supra note 13. More routine and nonsubstantive court notices and decisions are 
excluded. Interview 2012-24. 
 19.  Interview 2012-13; Implementing Rules, supra note 13, art. 5. 
 20.  Interview 2012-24; Implementing Rules, supra note 13, art. 16. The Rules state that cases 
may be removed if a party makes a valid request or a serious error is discovered, but only after 
formal review by senior officials at the court that posted the decision. The rules appear designed to 
prevent individual judges from removing cases that they do not want made public. 
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range of family law disputes.21 By contrast, no exception is made for criminal 
cases; a defendant has no right to request a case not be made public or be 
removed after it is posted online.22 Certain information is redacted: victim and 
witness names are removed prior to publication, as are parties’ phone numbers 
and addresses.23 
The exceptions leave significant room for local court interpretation. 
Nevertheless, the policy is designed to require posting most cases online. 
Provincial high court rules state that judges who believe a case should not be 
placed online must seek approval from a court vice-president; otherwise, all 
cases must be submitted for online posting at most three days after judgment is 
handed to the parties. Cases submitted for online posting are reviewed by a court 
official responsible for the website who has an additional three days to decide 
whether or not to make the case publicly available.24 
As of early 2013, the Henan High Court reported that more than 440,000 
cases had been posted online since the policy was adopted in 2009.25 By early 
2014, that number had increased to more than 600,000.26 Although official 
 
 21.  Interview 2012-13; Implementing Rules, supra note 13, arts. 6, 7. The regulations state 
that legitimate reasons for granting such a request include cases in which “there is strong 
antagonism” among the parties or between one party and the court or the contents of an opinion may 
cause “emotional pressure or negative effects” to a litigant or third party. The rules list certain 
categories of cases likely to have such an effect: those involving reputation rights, disputes among 
neighbors, divorce cases, claims concerning care for the elderly, inheritance disputes and those likely 
to “intensify contradictions.” 
 22.  Interview 2012-13; Implementing Rules, supra note 13, arts. 6, 7. 
 23.  Interview 2012-24; Implementing Rules, supra note 13, art. 22. The Implementing Rules 
state that victims’ names are to be excluded only in cases involving violent crimes. In practice it 
appears that victims’ names are redacted in all cases. The Rules state that full names, gender, and 
age of parties is to be included, but all other information is to be redacted. See also id. art. 21 (stating 
that witnesses, juveniles, and those performing meritorious conduct such as helping to arrest a 
defendant shall be listed only by last name). 
 24.  Interview 2012-13; Implementing Rules, supra note 13, arts. 10, 11. The Rules state that 
the presiding judge has three days from receiving confirmation that the decision has been delivered 
to the parties, or from the end of the stipulated time for delivery, to submit the judgment for posting. 
If the judge responsible for posting cases decides not to place a decision online she or he must 
provide a specific reason for such a decision. 
 25.  Henan Sanji Fayuan Shangwang Gongkai Caipan Wenshu Yu 44 Wan Jian (河南三级
法院上网公开裁判文书逾4 4万件 ) [Henan Three Levels of Courts Have Published More than 
440,000 Cases Online], RENMIN FAYUAN PINDAO (人民法院频道 ) [PEOPLE’S COURT CHANNEL] 
(Jan. 25, 2013), http://court.gmw.cn/html/article/201301/25/117953.shtml. The figure was 280,000 
as of early 2012; Interview 2012-24; see also Henan Fayuan Caipan Wenshu Shangwang 28 Wan Yu 
Fen (河南法院裁判文书上网2 8万余份 ) [More Than 280,000 Henan Court Judgment Are 
Available Online], CAIXIN WANG (财新网 ) [ECONOMIC NEWS NET] (Jan. 31, 2012), 
http://china.caixin.com/2012-01-31/100352036.html. 
 26.  Henan Sheng Gaoji Renmin Fayuan Gongzuo Baogao (河南省高级人民法院工作报告) 
[Henan High People’s Court Work Report], ZHONGGUO FAYUAN WANG (中国法院网) [CHINA 
COURT WEB] (Jan. 22, 2014), http://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2014/01/id/1205214.shtml; 
see also interview 2014-1. 
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reports claim Henan courts now put ninety-nine percent of their cases online,27 
this figure refers to cases outside the exceptions. In practice, a significant 
percentage of court rulings are not posted online: for example, court-approved 
mediation agreements, which represent a large portion of all first-instance civil 
cases.28 
Initially, cases posted online were not permanently made public. Court 
rules stated that cases should be public for one year, and in the initial years of 
the policy courts generally removed cases from their websites at the end of the 
calendar year. As judges explained, the primary goals of making cases publicly 
available are “to make courts transparent,”29 to increase public confidence in the 
courts, and to increase pressure on judges to decide cases correctly.30 These 
goals are achieved with the publication of cases for one year. In practice, 
however, many such cases remain available in commercial case databases even 
after they have been removed from court websites. The policy also appears to be 
evolving toward permanent publication of cases. In 2012, the Henan High Court 
began aggregating all cases province-wide onto its own website, with cases no 
longer being removed after one year.31 
The decision to place cases online came in the wake of a number of high-
profile wrongful convictions in Henan. Zhang Liyong, the president of the 
Henan High People’s Court, stated that the policy of placing opinions online 
was “compelled” by the illegal conduct of some judges. Zhang stated that with 
online publication, errors by judges will be “immediately discovered and 
criticized online.” 32 Judges now know that any errors will directly affect their 
 
 27.  One report from late 2011 put the figure at 99.37%. See 
Judicial Reform in Henan Gets Public Support, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE, Dec. 12, 2011, 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/102774/7674038.html.  
 28.  Interview 2012-24; Henan Provincial High Court’s Notice on Printing and Distributing 
Court Judgment Publication Online Measures, supra note 13, art. 4. 
 29.  Interview 2012-13. 
 30.  Interview 2012-24; see also Notice on the Situation Concerning Placing Henan Court 
Judgments on the Internet, supra note 13. 
 31.  Henan Kaitong Caipan Wenshu Wang He Tingshen Zhibo Wang 
(河南开通裁判文书网和庭审直播网)  [Henan Launches Case Website and Trial Live-Streaming 
Website], ZHONGGUO FAYUAN WANG (中国法院网) [CHINA COURT WEB] (May 17, 2012), 
http://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2012/05/id/517955.shtml. 
 32.  See Henan Fayuan Jiang Caipan Wenshu Shangwang “Daobi” Faguan Jinze 
(河南法院将裁判文书上网”倒逼”法官尽责) [Online Publication of Judgments Forces Judges to be 
Responsible], ZHONGGUO WANG (中国网) [CHINA NET] (Jan. 25, 2009), 
http://www.china.com.cn/law/txt/2009-01/25/content_17185088.htm; see also Notice on the 
Situation Concerning Placing Henan Court Judgments on the Internet, supra note 13 (commenting 
that online publications of judgments have offered judges an opportunity to study precedents and 
narrow the discrepancy and randomness among judgments). Implicit in Zhang’s comment was the 
argument that erroneous outcomes in criminal cases are the fault of the courts. In practice, however, 
it seems clear that many errors in criminal cases result from mistakes or misconduct by the police 
and procuratorates and the courts’ subsequent inability or unwillingness to challenge such mistakes. 
I discuss this phenomenon in the context of one high-profile Henan case elsewhere. See Benjamin 
Liebman, Professionals and Populists: The Paradoxes of China’s Legal Reforms, in CHINA IN AND 
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chances of promotion. Placing cases online is not intended to facilitate use of the 
decisions in future cases or to serve as precedent.33 Nevertheless, judges 
acknowledge that lawyers often use prior cases in legal arguments.34 
Local courts in Henan vary in their implementation of the policy. Some 
courts have taken more restrictive approaches to access than suggested by the 
provincial high court, for example by not posting cases that have been 
appealed.35 Some jurisdictions appear to have liberal definitions of privacy 
interests, and thus keep a larger percentage of cases from being posted. Yet a 
number of courts also report “100 percent compliance” with the high court’s 
rules—meaning that they have posted all cases that do not come within a listed 
exception.36 The provincial high court has criticized courts that have lagged in 
compliance.37 High court officials report that in general most courts have 
complied with the policy.38 
 
BEYOND THE HEADLINES 214, 215 (Timothy B. Weston & Lionel M. Jensen eds., 2012). 
 33.  Interview 2012-13; Interview 2012-24. 
 34.  Interview 2012-13; see also Caipan Wenshu Shangwang “Yangguang Sifa” De Zhutuiqi 
(裁判文书上网 判阳光司法”的助推器) [Online Publication of Opinions Promotes “Sunny Judicial 
Administration”], ZHONGGUO PUFA WANG (中国普法网) [CHINA LEGAL INFO] (Oct. 9, 2012), 
http://www.legalinfo.gov.cn/pfkt/content/2012-10/09/content_3886221.htm?node=7908 (quoting 
lawyer noting the “reference value” of cases posted online). 
 35.  Interview 2012-24; Caipan Wenshu Shangwang Guocheng Zhong Cunzai De Wenti He 
Duice (裁判文书上网过程中存在的问题和对策) [Problems Facing Publishing Judgments Online and 
Solutions to Such Problems], HENAN FAYUAN WANG (河南法院网) [HENAN COURT NET] (Aug. 30, 
2011), http://hnfy.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2011/08/id/777200.shtml; Ji Yangguang Fangfu Zhi 
Gongneng Er Mian Qi Zhuoshang Zhihuan—Zenme Kan Caipan Wenshu Shangwang 
(集阳光防腐之功能而免其灼伤之患—怎么看裁判文书上网) [Take Advantage of Online Publication’s 
Sunshine Power Without Getting Burnt—How to Look at Online Publication of Judgments], 
ZHONGGUO MINSHANG FALÜ WANG (中国民商法律网) [CHINA CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL LAW NET] 
(Jun. 9, 2012), http://test.civillaw.com.cn/Article/default.asp?id=55495 (stating that nonfinal 
decisions shall not be posted online because they could “confuse the masses” if such decisions were 
subsequently changed). 
 36.  Interview 2012-13; Luoshan Xian Fayuan Caipan Wenshu Shangwang Lü Da 100% 
(罗山县法院裁判文书上网率达1 0 0 %) [Luoshan Municipality’s Court Judgments are 100% 
Published Online], HENAN SHENG LUOSHAN XIAN FAYUAN WANG (河南省罗山县法院网) 
[LUOSHAN COURT NET] (Oct. 16, 2012), http://xylsfy.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=1256; 
Nanyang Shi Wolong Qu Fayuan Qianghua Caipan Wenshu Shangwang Gongzuo Xiaoguo Hao 
(南阳市卧龙区法院强化裁判文书上网工作效果好) [Nanyang Municipal Wolong District Court 
Reinforced the Online Publication of Judgments and the Effect Is Positive], ZHONGXIN WANG 
(中新网) [CHINA NEWS NET] (Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.ha.chinanews.com/lanmu/news/159/2011-
07-01/news-159-127846.shtml (claiming one hundred percent compliance in one court). 
 37.  Interview 2012-24; see also Notice on the Situation Concerning Placing Henan Court 
Judgments on the Internet, supra note 13. In 2009, fifteen basic-level courts that “lagged behind” in 
implementing the policy were exposed and the presidents of such courts were required to come to 
the provincial high court to explain why they had not complied. The high court stated that such 
actions were highly effective in promoting compliance. The Implementing Rules call for the 
Provincial High Court to engage in regular review of implementation of the policy by each division 
in the high court and by all lower courts, including issuing a ranking of courts based on their level of 
compliance. Courts that lag in implementing the policy “are to have points deducted” when they are 
evaluated. Implementing Rules, supra note 13, art. 36.  
 38.  Interview 2012-24. 
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The policy of putting cases online initially encountered resistance from 
judges who feared increased workloads and scrutiny.39 Judges and courts are 
now evaluated based on the percentage of cases they put online.40 Judges 
describe such efforts as resulting in “tremendous pressure” on them as they 
handle cases.41 Lawyers concur, noting that judges are under pressure to avoid 
mistakes and as a result are now far more careful than in the past.42 
The policy of making cases public has generally been praised by officials, 
lawyers, and academics.43 For example, lawyers who handle criminal cases 
praised the policy, arguing that judges need to be controlled—and that greater 
oversight and transparency are effective routes for doing so.44 Yet the policy has 
also received criticism. A number of lawyers and academics in Henan expressed 
concern in discussions that the push to place all decisions online is resulting in 
 
 39.  Interview 2012-24; see also Notice on the Situation Concerning Placing Henan Court 
Judgments on the Internet, supra note 13 (acknowledging and critiquing resistance to the policy 
among some judges who were concerned either at the workload or the effect of publishing cases 
online). 
 40.  Interview 2012-3; Interview 2012-13; Implementing Rules, supra note 13, art. 18. The 
implementing rules state that judges who fail to comply with the policy, or who delay in making 
cases public, shall be subject to administrative sanctions. Implementing Rules, art. 18. 
 41.  Interview 2012-11; Interview 2012-19; Henan Gaoyuan Jiang Panjueshu Shangwang 
Gong Shimin Chaxun (河南高院将判决书上网供市民查询) [Henan Provincial High Court Uploaded 
Court Opinions Online for Citizens to Examine], DAHE WANG (大河网) [DAHE NET] (Dec. 31, 
2008), http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2008-12-31/072216954042.shtml (quoting judge stating that even a 
small error may be reported by parties); Zhang Liyong Daibiao Yu Wangyou Zaixian Jiaoliu: 
Zhengyi Buneng Guanzai Wuzi Li (张立勇代表与网友在线交流：正义不能关在屋子里) 
[Representative Zhang Liyong Communicates with Netizens Online: Justice Should Not Be Locked in 
a Room], ZHONGGUO FAYUAN WANG (中国法院网) [CHINA LEGAL INFO NET] (Mar. 5, 2009), 
http://old.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=347301 (stating that judges know that their decisions 
will be posted online and examined by ordinary people, and thus will be careful to follow the law 
from the beginning).  
 42.  Interview 2012-7. 
 43.  Zhang Liyong, Shehui Fating: Tiaochu Fayuan Zhiwai de Shijian Yu Sikao 
(社会法庭：跳出法院之外的实践与思考) [Society Courts: Practice and Thoughts Outside the 
Courtroom], RENMIN FAYUAN BAO (人民法院报) [PEOPLE’S COURT NEWS] (Mar 17, 2010), 
http://old.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=399684 (reporting official praise for Henan’s Court 
reforms); Henan Shengwei Shuji Lu Zhangong Yu Faguan Daibiao Zuotan 
(河南省委书记卢展工与法官代表座谈) [Party Secretary of Henan Province Meets Representatives of 
Judges], FAZHI RIBAO (法制日报 ) [LEGAL DAILY] (Apr. 19, 2011), 
http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/bm/content/2011-04/19/content_2603116.htm?node=20729 (reporting 
praise of Henan courts by Lu Zhangong, Party Secretary of Henan); Fayuan Gongzuo Liangdian 
Duo Qunzhong Manyidu Gao (法院工作亮点多群众满意度高) [There Are Many Highlights in Courts’ 
Work and Approval Rate Is High], RENMIN FAYUAN BAO (人民法院报) [PEOPLE’S COURT NEWS] 
(Jan. 17, 2012), http://www.mzyfz.com/cms/fayuanpingtai/xinwenzhongxin/fayuanxinwen/html/107
1/2012-01-17/content-272259.html (reporting praise of courts by Henan party officials).  
 44.  Interview 2012-6; Interview 2012-28; see also Zhang Liyong, Yi Caipan Wenshu 
Shangwang Tuidong Sifa Gongkai (以裁判文书上网推动司法公开) [Promote Judicial Openness 
through Online Publication of Decisions], FAZHI RIBAO (法制日报) [LEGAL DAILY] (Jul. 31, 2012), 
http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/zt/content/2012-07/31/content_3741689.htm (stating that court 
decisions are “a product” and that whether decisions are satisfactory is decided by litigants and the 
masses, not the courts themselves, and that placing decisions online will force courts to improve).  
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court judgments that are increasingly simple in their reasoning; these lawyers 
suggest that this simplicity is the result of judges trying to avoid any possible 
errors.45 As one lawyer noted, in Henan any error becomes a “big error” when it 
is posted online.46 This alleged trend toward simplified reasoning is in tension 
with the SPC’s efforts to encourage courts to provide more detailed explanations 
of their reasoning in opinions.47 High court officials, in contrast, argue that the 
policy has forced judges to pay more attention to legal analysis and thus has 
improved the overall quality of court opinions.48 
I selected for study one rural county court in Henan that appeared to be 
putting the large majority of cases of all types online in 2010.49 The court is 
situated in the county seat, an average-sized county town in China. I do not 
claim that this county is representative either of basic courts in Henan or of 
courts across China more generally. It is one of thousands of such courts in 
China.50 I also do not claim that my study is comprehensive: in 2010, the court 
placed 171 cases online. I supplemented the cases found online with an 
additional 6 cases from the county court that were located on commercial 
websites,51 making a total of 177 cases. The highest reported case number was 
 
 45.  Interview 2012-2; Interview 2012-3; see also Liu Yuewu, Xingshi Panjueshu Ni Qineng 
Bu Jiangli? (刑事判决书你岂能不讲理?) [How Can You Not Give Reasons in Criminal 
Adjudication], FENGHUANG BOKE (凤凰博客) [FENGHUANG BLOG] (May 17, 2012), 
http://blog.ifeng.com/article/17858797.html (reporting that decisions in criminal cases have become 
increasingly simple and lack reasoning); Hu Yuansheng, Minshi Panjueshu Yue Xie Yue Jiandan 
(民事判决书越写越简单) [Civil Opinions Are Becoming Increasingly Simple], TIANYA (天涯) 
[TIANYA BLOG] (Dec. 10, 2008), http://blog.tianya.cn/blogger/post_read.asp?BlogID=1879622&Pos
tID=15981099 (arguing that opinions in civil cases have become increasingly simple and thus 
increasingly resemble criminal cases). 
 46.  Interview 2012-3. 
 47.  See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Jinyibu Jiaqiang Sifabianmin de Ruogan Yijian 
(最高人民法院关于进一步加强司法便民工作的若干意见) [Some Opinions of the Sup. People’s Ct. on 
Further Strengthening People’s Access to Judicial Services] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., 
Mar. 10, 2009), available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2009-03/10/content_10981330.htm 
(stating that court opinions should be clear, concise, and should provide sufficient reasoning to 
convince the parties); see also Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Sifa Gongkai de Liuxiang Guiding 
(最高人民法院《关于司法公开的六项规定) [Notice of the Supreme People’s Court on Issuing the Six 
Provisions on Judicial Openness], ZHONGGUO XINGWENG WANG (中国新闻网) [CHINA NEWS] 
(Dec. 23, 2009), http://www.chinanews.com/gn/news/2009/12-23/2034717.shtml (requiring courts to 
provide reasons to support their decisions).  
 48.  Interview 2012-25. 
 49.  This was done after surveying a range of Henan courts in 2010 to ascertain the volume of 
cases being put online. Judges and lawyers in the jurisdiction agreed to speak with me on the 
understanding that their names and the name of their courts would not be identified. I identify court 
decisions with a letter, indicating whether the decision came from the intermediate court (I) or basic-
level court (B), followed by a reference number. I cite interviews based on the year in which the 
interview occurred.  
 50.  The county court has forty-five persons classified as judges, thirty of whom hear cases. 
Interview 2013-9. 
 51.  It is unclear why those six cases were not posted to the court website. They do not appear 
particularly sensitive or noteworthy. The cases may have been cases originally posted online and 
then removed, as they are also available on the provincial high court website, which collects cases 
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number 221, suggesting that the court placed roughly eighty percent of cases on 
its website.52 Most omitted cases involve juveniles charged with crimes or 
rape.53 Judges state that it is rare for a party to a criminal case to object to the 
decision being placed online.54 
I also examined the publicly available annual criminal docket for 2010 of 
the intermediate court in the same jurisdiction (the court directly above the 
county court). The intermediate court is located in a third-tier Chinese city, with 
a combined rural and urban population of approximately six million. The county 
is home to roughly five hundred thousand people.55 The intermediate court has 
jurisdiction over a total of twelve county or district courts.56 The cases on 
review in the intermediate court thus came from a broader geographic area than 
those in the county court. The intermediate court posted 276 opinions in 
criminal cases from 2010 on its website. I located an additional 16 on 
commercial websites, making a total of 292 judgments.57 Of these, 37 were 
first-instance trials, 239 were decisions in appeals, and 16 were decisions in 
rehearing procedures. Intermediate court decisions were divided across three 
court divisions. Calculating the percentage of cases posted from the intermediate 
court is thus more difficult than for the county court. Nevertheless, using the 
highest case number as a guide and excluding decisions from the court’s third 
criminal division, which handles cases involving crimes committed by juveniles, 
it appears that the court posted just under half of its first-instance decisions not 
involving juvenile crimes, just over three-quarters of its appellate decisions, and 
just over two-thirds of its rehearing cases.58 According to intermediate court 
officials, as of early 2012 the court had placed nearly seven thousand decisions 
on its website since the online policy began in the second half of 2009.59 This 
was roughly half of the total number of decisional documents issued by the 
intermediate court during the same period. The vast majority of excluded 
documents were mediation agreements or decisional documents that do not 
discuss the merits of a case.60 The court reported just 37 instances during the 
 
posted to lower-court websites. 
 52.  Court officials confirmed this rough calculation and stated that in 2012 the figure was 
closer to ninety percent. Interview 2013-8. 
 53.  Interview 2013-8; 2013-9. 
 54.  Interview 2013-8. 
 55.  Zhongguo Yixian Erxian Sanxian Chengshi Mingdan (中国一线二线三线城市名单) 
[China’s First Tier, Second Tier, Third Their Cities List], 360DOC (Aug. 28, 2011), 
http://www.360doc.com/content/11/0828/08/0_143824472.shtml. 
 56.  Eight lower courts were county courts and thus primarily rural. Four were district courts, 
meaning they were in towns or urban areas. 
 57.  As with the county cases, the additional cases do not appear to be particularly sensitive or 
noteworthy, and it is unclear why they were not available on the intermediate-court website.  
 58.  I calculated this approximate figure by dividing the total number of cases available by the 
combination of the highest case numbers for each criminal division.  
 59.  Interview 2012-13.  
 60.  Id. 
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same period when a case of any type was not posted online at the request of one 
of the parties.61 In addition to reviewing the cases, I conducted interviews with 
approximately forty judges and lawyers in three cities in Henan. 
The push to place court decisions online is one of a number of innovations 
adopted under the leadership of Henan High People’s Court President Zhang 
Liyong. Zhang, who came to the court with no legal background, has promoted 
new policies he said are designed to increase the quality of, and public 
confidence in, Henan’s courts.62 These have included: live broadcasts of court 
cases;63 requiring court leaders to meet directly with aggrieved litigants; 
experimentation with a form of jury system;64 requiring courts to hold hearings 
in villages;65 the creation of “society courts” (shehuifating) staffed by laypeople 
to mediate cases;66 the establishment of an annual “wrongful conviction day” on 
which courts examine their files for any incorrectly decided cases; and the 
creation of a “life responsibility system” for judges, under which judges are 
responsible “until the end of their lives” for any errors made in handling cases.67 
 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Da Faguan Zhang Liyong Wunian Kao (大法官张立勇五年考) [Grand Judge Zhang 
Liyong’s Exam in the Fifth Year], MINZHU YU FAZHI WANG (民主与法制网) [DEMOCRACY AND 
LEGAL SYSTEM NET] (Nov. 12, 2012), http://www.mzyfz.com/cms/minzhuyufazhishibao/fanfu/html
/1248/2012-11-12/content-568478.html (discussing Henan efforts to make courts more welcoming to 
ordinary people and requiring judges to be more like ordinary people, strengthening courts’ 
obedience to Party leadership and their rejection of concepts of separation of powers, and making 
courts more open to comments from ordinary people). The moves were controversial, with some 
complaining that judges were being forced to take on inappropriate roles and would be overwhelmed 
by their new workload. 
 63.  For a live broadcast of court cases of Henan Courts, see http://ts.hncourt.org/. As of early 
2012, the High Court reported that more than 1500 cases had been broadcast online.  
 64.  Henan Gaoyuan Yuanzhang Jianyi Pizhun Jinxing Renmin Peishentuan Shidian 
(河南高院院长建议批准进行人民陪审团试点) [Chief Judge of Henan Provincial High Ct. Proposes 
Approving Jury Trial Experiment], DAHE BAO (大河报) [DAHE NEWS], (Mar. 13, 2012), 
http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2012-03-13/031424103258.shtml. 
 65.  Henan Sheng Gaoji Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Dali Hongyang Ma Xiwu Shenpan Fangshi 
Qieshi Wei Renmin Sifa De Yijian (河南省高级人民法院关于大力弘扬马锡五审判方式切实为人民司法
的意见) [Henan High People’s Court’s Notice on Energetically Carrying Forward Ma Xiwu-Style 
Adjudication in Order to Implement Justice for the People] (promulgated by the Henan High 
People’s Ct., Jul. 15, 2009), available at http://zzfy.hncourt.org/public/detail.php?id=11729. 
 66.  See “Shehui Fating”: Huajie Maodun De Henan Chuangzao (“社会法庭” :  
化解矛盾的河南创造)  [“Society Courts”: A Henan Innovation That Resolves Contradictions], 
HENAN PINGAN WANG (河南平安网) [HENAN PINGAN NET] (Jun. 3, 2011), 
http://www.mzyfz.com/cms/jujiaosanxiangzhongdiangongcheng/shehuiguanlichuangxin/shehuibaoz
hang/html/1037/2011-06-03/content-76470.html; see also Zhao Gang et al., Xuchang Fayuan: Dakai 
Shehui Fating Shenshang De Wenhao (许昌法院：打开社会法庭身上的问号) [Xuchang Court: 
Unfold the Question Mark on Society Courts], LUOYANG SHI XIGONG QU RENMIN FAYUAN WANG 
(洛阳市西工区人民法院网) [LUOYANG PEOPLE’S COURT] (May 17, 2011), http://xgqfy.chinacourt.or
g/public/detail.php?id=78. Society courts, made up of ordinary people selected from the local 
community, are designed to further mediation in routine cases. They appear largely to be the 
repackaging of traditional mediation authorities under the direct supervision of the courts.  
 67.  See Ji Tianfu, Henan Fayuan Yanjiu Jianli Cuoan Zeren Zhongshen Zhuijiu Zhidu 
(河南法院将研究建立错案责任终身追究制度) [Henan Courts Will Research and Establish Lifelong 
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Zhang has also welcomed increased supervision of the courts from the People’s 
Congress representatives.68 Some of these policies have drawn extensive 
criticism from legal academics, who warn of a return to populist justice and who 
argue that many of these reforms lack a legal basis.69 In one prominent early 
account of Zhang’s reforms, Southern Weekend described him as a “judge who 
does not play according to legal principles.”70 Yet others in the legal community 
have come to his defense, noting that he has significantly increased judicial 
transparency.71 
 
Responsibility System for Wrongly Decided Cases], RENMIN FAYUAN WANG (人民法院网) 
[PEOPLE’S COURT NET] (Jan. 11, 2012), http://court.gmw.cn/html/article/201201/11/83609.shtml. It 
appears that the lifetime responsibility system is targeted at the most egregious forms of judicial 
misconduct, primarily corruption. 
 68.  Henan: Fayuan Ban’an Yao Zhudong Jieshou Renda Daibiao Jiandu (河南:  
法院办案要主动接受人大代表监督) [Henan: Courts Should Take Initiative To Accept People’s 
Congress’s Supervision over their Handling of Cases], FAZHI WANG (法制网) [LEGAL DAILY] (Sep. 
15, 2011), http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/index/content/201109/15/content_2956921.htm?node=209
08 (detailing requirements that each court report on its work to every local people’s congresses 
delegate regularly, including on its handling of major cases; that courts invite delegates to attend 
cases and participate in enforcement activities; and that each court establish a text-messaging system 
to report to People’s Congress members on their work); see also Henan Sanji Fayuan Quanbu 
Kaitong Renda Daibiao Zhengxie Weiyuan Zhuanxian Dianhua (河南三级法院全部开通人大代表政
协委员专线电话) [Three Levels of Courts in Henan All Opened Hotlines for People’s Congress 
Representatives and People’s Consultative Committee Members], ZHONGGUO FAYUAN WANG 
HENAN PINGDAO (中国法院网河南频道) [CHINA COURT] (Apr. 21, 2012), http://www.chinacourt.org
/article/detail/2012/04/id/479195.shtml (discussing the creation of hotlines to be used by people’s 
congress delegates to contact the courts twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, and requiring 
courts to respond to any enquiries within one working day). 
 69.  See He Weifang, Sifa Gaige Bixu An Fali Chupai (司法改革必须按法理出牌) [Legal 
Reform Must Follow Legal Principles], 360DOC (Feb. 27, 2009), http://www.360doc.com/content/09
/0227/16/142_2660965.shtml (arguing that populist justice is sometimes bad law and that some of 
Zhang Liyong’s reform measures may set a bad example for judicial reform); Guo Guangdong, 
Yuanzhang, Qing An Fali Chupai (院长,  请按法理出牌) [Court President, Please Play by Legal 
Principles], NANFANG ZHOUMO (南方周末) [SOUTHERN WEEKEND] (Feb. 2, 2011), 
http://www.gongxue.cn/landunfalv/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=97378; Buan Fali Chupai Zhi 
Yuanzhang Yulu de Shixiang Zai Zhiyi (不按法理出牌之院长语录的十项再质疑) [Ten Doubts on the 
Quotations of the Court President Who Does Not Follow Legal Principles], ZHENGYI WANG (正义网) 
[JUSTICE NET] (Apr. 6, 2012), http://chinaszjt.fyfz.cn/art/1048006.htm (arguing that only one or two 
measures Zhang adopted are reasonable but that others hurt the independence and credibility of the 
judicial system); Guo Shushan, Zhang Yuanzhang Chuli Pingdingshan Fayuan De Zuofa Fansi 
(张院长处理平顶山法院的做法反思) [Reflection on Chief Judge Zhang’s Measures for Handling 
Pingdingshang Court], FALÜ WANG (法律网) [LEGAL NET] (Jan. 20, 2011), 
http://www.66law.cn/domainblog/24124.aspx (criticizing reforms under Zhang Liyong for confusing 
the role of courts and “ordinary Party-state entities” and for undermining judicial independence). 
 70.  See Su Yongtong, Buan “Fali” Chupai De Gaoyuan Yuanzhang (不按”法理”出牌的
高院院长 ) [High Court President Does Not Play According to Legal Principles], NANFANG 
ZHUOMO (南方周 ) [SOUTHERN WEEKEND] (Feb. 19, 2009), http://www.infzm.com/content/24067 
(describing promotion of informal trials and mediation, increasing role of popular input, deemphasis 
on judicial professionalism, and increasing administrative oversight over lower courts). 
 71.  See Zhang Yifei, Bubi Keze Henan Fayuan De “Zhang Yuanzhang Xinzheng” 
(不必苛责河南法院的 “张院长新政” ) [It Is Not Necessary To Criticize Court President Zhang’s New 
Measures], HONG WANG (红网) [RED NET] (Mar. 6, 2009), http://hlj.rednet.cn/c/2009/03/06/172020
8.htm (praising Zhang Liyong’s reforms as compatible with the reality of China); Sifa Shijian 
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1. County Court 
The 177 county court cases included criminal charges against 273 
defendants. In the county court, the types of cases were largely what would be 
expected: the largest categories of crimes were theft, willful injury (generally 
relating to fights), traffic accident crimes, concealment of criminal proceeds 
(largely reselling stolen goods), and fraud. But the cases also included a range of 
crimes that provide a sense of the types of issues local police, procuratorates, 
and courts process—everything from dissemination of porn online,72 to illegal 
logging or cutting of trees,73 to abduction and sale of children or women,74 
rape,75 bigamy,76 corruption,77 and gambling.78 A large number of cases 
involve fellow villagers. Table 1 sets forth the range of crimes and number of 
defendants prosecuted for each category of crime in the county court in 2010. In 
the county court, 133 cases were handled in summary procedures or simplified 
normal procedures; often these were tried without procurators attending.79 
Although most were minor cases where defendants did not contest the charges 
against them, others involved more serious charges, including one case in which 
a defendant was convicted of rape.80 
 
Weishenme Mei An Fali Chupai (司法实践为什么没按 “法理”  出牌) [Why Doesn’t Judicial Practice 
Follow “Legal Principles”], FALÜ BOKE (法律博客) [LAW BLOG] (Nov. 13, 2009), 
http://liumushuofa.fyfz.cn/art/544585.htm (arguing that courts are not trusted in Chinese society and 
that courts should do more to emulate administrative agencies); Wang Liping, Sifa Gaige De 
Kunjing Yu Lujing (司法改革的困境与路径) [The Predicament of and Path for Judicial Reform], 
ZHONGGUO RENMIN DAXUE LÜSHI XUEYUAN (中国人民大学律师学院) [LAWYER COLLEGE RENMIN 
UNIVERSITY OF CHINA] (Apr. 21, 2011), http://lawyer.ruc.edu.cn/html/lswy/3870.html (arguing that 
under the reforms in Henan judges are shifting from more elite status to “legal service providers,” 
and are “entering into society” with their primary focus being on social stability, and noting that the 
reforms are consistent with the general political framework in China). 
 72.  Cases B66, B99, and B200. 
 73.  Cases B45, B51, B80, and B92. Although classified as environmental crimes, these cases 
largely appear to be handled as theft cases. 
 74.  Cases B32 and B94. 
 75.  Case B166. 
 76.  Case B2. 
 77.  Cases B104, B169, B203, and B213. 
 78.  Cases B90 (gambling) and B97 (operation of a gambling facility). 
 79.  Procurators attended 77 of the 133 trials involving defendants tried through simplified or 
simplified normal procedures. The 1996 Criminal Procedure Law did not require procurator 
attendance in cases tried through simplified procedures. 1996 Criminal Procedure Law, supra note 6, 
art 153. The 2012 Criminal Procedure Law makes procurator attendance mandatory at all trials. 2012 
Criminal Procedure Law, supra note 6, art. 210. 
 80.  Case B166. Although the opinion stated that the court used simplified procedures, three 
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TABLE 1: CASES PROSECUTED IN THE COUNTY COURT BY CRIME SENTENCED 
Case Type Defendants Cases 
Abduction and trafficking of children (拐卖儿童罪) 3 1 
Abduction and trafficking of women (拐卖妇女罪) 2 1 
Arson (放火罪) 1 1 
Bigamy (重婚罪) 1 1 
Bribery (受贿罪) 1 1 
Concealment of illegal gains (掩饰、隐瞒犯罪所
得罪) 
49 22 
Contract fraud (合同诈骗罪) 3 3 
Corruption (贪污罪) 3 3 
Destruction of electrical equipment (破坏电力设备
罪) 
2 1 
Dissemination of obscene materials (传播淫秽物品
罪) 
14 4 
Disturbance of the peace (寻衅滋事罪) 5 3 
Embezzlement (职务侵占罪) 1 1 
Extortion and blackmail (敲诈勒索罪) 2 2 
Falsely issuing exclusive value-added tax invoices  
(虚开增值税专用发票罪) 
6 2 
Forgery and/or sale of state authorities’ certificates  
(伪造、买卖国家机关证件罪) 
5 1 
Fraud (诈骗罪) 8 8 
Gambling (赌博罪) 5 1 
Illegal business act (非法经营罪) 1 1 
Illegal logging (滥伐林木罪) 11 4 
Illegal occupation of farmland (非法占用农用地) 3 3 
Illegal possession of guns (非法持有枪支罪) 1 1 
Illegal sale of invoices (非法出售发票罪) 1 1 
Intentional destruction of property (故意毁坏财物
罪) 
1 1 
Intentional injury (故意伤害罪) 37 35 
Interference with public administration (妨害公务 4 4 
 
judges heard the case (as opposed to most simplified cases, where generally only a single judge 
hears the case). The defendant contested guilt, arguing that sex had been consensual. Nevertheless, 
the court deemed defendant to have confessed because he admitted having sex with the mentally 
disabled victim. 
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罪) 
Involuntary manslaughter (过失致人死亡罪) 1 1 
Misappropriation of public funds (挪用公款罪) 1 1 
Operation of gambling facility (开设赌场罪) 1 1 
Organized robbery (聚众哄抢罪) 8 1 
Production and/or sale of fake and substandard 
products (生产、销售伪劣产品罪) 
5 2 
Rape (强奸罪) 1 1 
Refusal to execute court decision (拒不执行法院判
决罪) 
1 1 
Robbery (抢劫罪) 2 1 
Seizure by force (抢夺罪) 1 1 
Theft (盗窃罪) 58 43 
Traffic accident (交通肇事罪) 28 28 
Total 277 187 
Note: “Cases” refers to the number of cases in which a particular crime was 
charged. Cases with multiple charges are thus counted multiple times. The total 
number of unique cases is 177. 
“Defendants” refers to the number of defendants charged with a particular crime. 
Defendants who are charged with more than one crime are counted multiple 
times.  
2. Intermediate Court 
Tables 2–4 provide an overview of cases in the intermediate court in first-
instance cases, on appeal, and in rehearing cases. The intermediate court tried 37 
first-instance cases involving 67 defendants. The court decided 239 cases on 
appeal, involving 442 defendants. The intermediate court also decided 16 
criminal cases through rehearing procedures, including 21 defendants. 
The intermediate court’s first-instance cases were, not surprisingly, more 
serious: murder and negligent homicide, illegal manufacture of explosives,81 
drug trafficking,82 illegal detention of others, and robbery while impersonating a 
police officer.83 A number of commercial and financial crimes were also tried in 
the intermediate court, including defendants convicted of illegally soliciting 
deposits (presumably running an illegal bank), selling fake medicine, and the 
sale of counterfeit goods. A few of the financial fraud cases resulted in 
suspended death sentences (for example, for the sale of counterfeit money) or 
 
 81.  Case I5b (life sentence). 
 82.  Case I44b (life sentence for trafficking one thousand grams of opium, where one thousand 
grams is the threshold for a sentence of ten years to death).  
 83.  Case I51b. 
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life imprisonment (for a first time offender convicted of selling counterfeit 
money).84 
TABLE 2: FIRST-INSTANCE INTERMEDIATE COURT CASES BY CRIMES 
CHARGED 
Crime Defendants Cases 
Credit card fraud (信用卡诈骗罪) 3 1 
Selling counterfeit money (出售假币罪) 1 1 
Bribery (受贿罪)  1 1 
Contract fraud (合同诈骗罪) 2 2 
Robbery (抢劫罪) 5 2 
Misappropriation of public funds (挪用公款罪) 1 1 
Concealment of stolen goods (掩饰，隐瞒犯罪所
得罪) 
2 2 
Willful injury (故意伤害罪) 22 12 
Intentional homicide (故意杀人罪) 10 9 
Theft (盗窃罪) 5 3 
Receipt fraud (票据诈骗罪) 3 1 
Harboring criminals (窝藏罪) 6 2 
Kidnapping (绑架罪) 1 1 
Fraud (诈骗) 1 1 
Drug trafficking (贩卖毒品罪) 4 2 
Corruption (贪污罪) 1 1 
Loan fraud (贷款诈骗罪) 3 1 
Fraudulent raising of capital (集资诈骗罪) 1 1 
Illegal manufacturing of explosives (非法制造爆炸
物罪) 
3 1 
Loan swindle (骗取贷款罪) 3 1 
Total 78 46 
Note: “Defendants” refers to the number of defendants charged with a particular 
crime. Defendants who are charged with more than one crime are counted 
multiple times.  
“Cases” refers to the number of cases in which a particular crime was charged. 
Cases with multiple charges are thus counted multiple times.  
 
 84.  Case I43a. 
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TABLE 3: APPEALS IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT BY CRIME CHARGED 
Crime  Defendants Cases 
Traffic accident (交通肇事罪) 17 16 
Perjury (伪造证据罪) 1 1 
Insurance fraud (保险诈骗罪) 3 1 
Torture (刑讯逼供罪) 1 1 
Participation in the mafia (参加黑社会罪) 16 2 
Bribery (受贿罪) 3 3 
Contract fraud (合同诈骗罪) 5 5 
Obstructing testimony (妨害作证罪) 2 2 
Obstructing public law enforcement (妨害公务罪) 18 5 
Provocation (寻衅滋事罪) 26 5 
Aid in destroying evidence (帮助毁灭证据) 4 1 
Aid criminals to escape punishment (帮助犯罪分
子逃避处罚罪) 
1 1 
Weapon theft (抢劫枪支罪) 1 1 
Robbery (抢劫罪) 21 10 
Abduction and sale of children (拐卖儿童罪) 9 4 
Abduction and sale of women (拐卖妇女罪) 1 1 
Misappropriation of public funds (挪用公款) 10 9 
Misappropriation of funds (挪用资金罪) 2 2 
Concealment of stolen goods (掩饰，隐瞒犯罪所
得罪) 
15 5 
Intentional injury (故意伤害罪) 96 68 
Intentional homicide (故意杀人罪) 6 4 
Intentional property damage (故意毁坏罪) 12 5 
Extortion (敲诈勒索罪) 27 5 
Crimes related to criminal syndicate (涉及黑社会
性质犯罪) 
17 3 
Illegal logging (滥伐林木罪) 1 1 
Abuse of power (滥用职权罪) 2 2 
Neglect of duty (玩忽职守) 1 1 
Producing and selling fake and inferior goods (生
产、销售伪劣产品罪) 
2 2 
Excavating ancient tombs (盗掘古墓) 1 1 
Theft (盗窃罪) 60 27 
Sabotaging production and business operation (破 1 1 
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坏生产经营罪) 
Kidnapping (绑架罪) 6 3 
Embezzlement (职务侵占罪) 11 8 
Assembling crowd to disturb social order (聚众扰
乱社会秩序罪) 
14 3 
Mob gathering and brawling (聚众斗殴) 3 1 
False reporting of company registration capital (虚
报注册资本) 
1 1 
Fraud (诈骗罪) 12 7 
False accusation (诬告陷害罪) 6 2 
Drug trafficking (贩卖毒品罪) 7 4 
Corruption (贪污犯罪) 18 15 
Buying counterfeit money (购买假币罪)  1 1 
Gambling (赌博罪) 1 1 
Negligent infliction of injury (过失致人重伤罪 ) 2 2 
Tax evasion (逃税罪) 11 2 
Knowingly selling merchandise under a fake 
trademark (销售假冒注册商标的商品罪) 
1 1 
Selling fake medicine (销售假药罪) 1 1 
Producing fake medicine (生产假药罪) 9 1 
Illegal trading of explosives (非法买卖爆炸物) 10 3 
Illegal production of and sale of falsified receipt    
(非法制造、出售非法制造发票罪) 
1 1 
Illegal manufacturing of explosives (非法制造爆
炸物罪) 
12 5 
Illegal occupation of farming land (非法占用农用
地罪) 
5 2 
Illegally accepting deposits from the public (非法
吸收公众存款罪) 
10 3 
Illegal detention (非法拘禁) 17 6 
Illegal possession of guns (非法持有枪支罪) 2 2 
Unlawful business operation (非法经营) 1 1 
Illegal practice of medicine (非法行医罪) 1 1 
Illegal Mining (非法采矿罪) 1 1 
Withdrawing public funds for investment (抽逃出
资罪) 
1 1 
Falsified tax receipts (虚开抵扣税款发票罪) 1 1 
Crime of having a large amount of undisclosed 
property (巨额财产来源不明 罪) 
1 1 
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Crime of concealing deposits offshore (隐瞒境外
存款罪) 
1 1 
Total 550 277 
Note: “Defendants” refers to the number of defendants charged with a particular 
crime. Defendants who are charged with more than one crime are counted 
multiple times. 
“Cases” refers to the number of cases in which a particular crime was charged. 
Cases with multiple charges are thus counted multiple times.  
TABLE 4: REHEARING (ZAISHEN) CASES IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT  
Crime  Defendants Cases 
Traffic accident crime (交通肇事罪) 2 2 
Misappropriation of public funds (挪用公款罪) 1 1 
Corruption (贪污罪) 2 2 
Willful injury (故意伤害罪) 8 5 
Provocation (寻衅滋事罪) 4 1 
Illegal detention (非法拘禁罪)  4 1 
Abuse of power (滥用职权罪)  1 1 
Theft (盗窃罪) 4 4 
Fraud (诈骗罪) 4 2 
Total 30 19 
Note: “Defendants” refers to the number of defendants charged with a particular 
crime. Defendants who are charged with more than one crime are counted 
multiple times.  
“Cases” refers to the number of cases in which a particular crime was charged. 
Cases with multiple charges are thus counted multiple times.  
B. Leniency and Settlement 
Scholars in China and the West have noted the national adoption of the 
policy of “balancing leniency and severity.”85 The policy, adopted in 2005 and 
 
 85.  See Trevaskes, supra ; Margaret K. Lewis, Leniency and Severity in China’s Death 
Penalty Debate, 24 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 303, 317 (2011) (discussing debate over leniency and 
severity in capital cases); Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Yinfa Guanyu Guanche Kuanyanxiangji Xingshi 
Zhengce De Ruogan Yijian De Tongzhi (最高人民法院印发《关于贯彻宽严相济刑事政策的若干意见
》的通知) [Supreme People’s Court’s Notice on Printing and Distributing Some Views on 
Implementation of the Criminal Policy of Balancing Leniency with Severity] (promulgated by Sup. 
People’s Ct., Feb. 8, 2010), available at http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=310425 
(stating that the policy of balancing leniency with severity is “the basic criminal policy of the nation” 
and that it should be implemented at all stages of the criminal process). The policy calls for strict 
sentences and the death penalty for serious crimes, including those that involve violence or threats to 
society, and leniency for less serious crimes, including nonviolent offenses or those lacking malice. 
The policy was first announced in a 2005 document from the Communist Party’s Central Political 
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implemented beginning in 2007,86 is generally understood as a reaction to the 
perception that prior reliance on “strike hard” campaigns had been ineffective 
and generated a strong backlash.87 The “balancing leniency and strictness” 
policy encourages procurators and courts to treat serious crimes harshly but also 
encourages them to be lenient toward minor crimes, especially those not 
reflecting malice or posing significant risk of harm to society. In the courts, the 
emphasis on leniency is primarily manifest in reduced sentences for those who 
confess, as well as on the use of suspended sentences in minor criminal cases for 
those who agree to pay restitution or compensation to their victims.88 
The Chinese Criminal Law89 provides multiple mechanisms for a court to 
be lenient (or not) in its disposition of a case. The law generally stipulates a 
range of punishments for each crime based on whether the offending conduct 
was minor, serious, or extremely serious, or, for monetary crimes, whether the 
amount involved was small, large, or extremely large.90 A court must first 
determine the severity of the crime, placing it within a codified sentencing band 
for a specific crime, after which it selects a sentence within that band. A court 
 
and Legal Committee. See also Zuigao Renmin Jianchayuan Guanyu Zai Jiancha Gongzuo Zhong 
Guanche Kuanyanxiangji Xingshi Sifa Zhengce De Ruogan Yijian (最高人民检察院关于在检察工作
中贯彻宽严相济刑事司法政策的若干意见) [Several Opinions on Implementing the Policy of 
Balancing Severity with Leniency in Criminal Adjudication] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s 
Procuratorate, Jan 15, 2007), available at http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=188373 
(stating that procuratorates are to follow the policy of balancing severity and leniency in order to 
reduce conflict and assist in the creation of a “socialist harmonious society”); Li Yunhui, 
Kuanyanxiangji Xingshi Zhengce Dingwei Ji Shixian De Lujing Xuanze 
(宽严相济刑事政策定位及实现的路径选择) [Policy Orientation and Route Selection for the 
Criminal Policy of Balancing Severity with Leniency], FAXUE LUNTAN (学 论 坛) [CHINA LAW INFO],
 http://www.chinalawinfo.org/fulltext_form.aspx?Db=qikan&Gid=1510092872&EncodingName= 
(last visited April 17, 2015) (describing creation of the policy). 
 86.  Susan Trevaskes, The Shifting Sands of Punishment in China in the Era of “Harmonious 
Society,” 32 LAW & POLICY 332, 346 (2010). 
 87.  See, e.g., LIU RENWEN, XINGFA DE JIEGOU YU SHIYE (刑法的结构与视野) [THE STRUCTURE 
AND SCOPE OF CRIMINAL LAW] 274–291 (2010) (arguing that the policy is primarily aimed at 
introducing leniency into the Chinese criminal justice system, as a reaction to the prior policy of 
striking hard against crime).  
 88.  In China the term “suspended sentence” generally refers to the suspension of the 
defendant’s prison term. Any fines imposed as part of the sentence are not suspended. In this Article, 
I use the term “suspended sentence” to refer to suspension of a prison sentence, and “sentence” to 
refer to a prison sentence. The use of fines as a criminal sanction in China is an important possible 
future topic of research. Although some decisions do impose fines on defendants, fines appeared to 
play a relatively minor role in criminal cases in the jurisdictions I studied and rarely came up in 
interviews. 
 89.  Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingfa (中华人民共和国刑法) [Criminal Law of the 
People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 14, 1997, President 
Order No. 83, of the President of the People’s Republic of China. Mar. 14, 1997, amended Feb. 25, 
2011), available at http://www.china.com.cn/policy/txt/2012-01/14/content_24405327.htm (last 
visited Apr. 11, 2015) [hereafter Criminal Law]. 
 90.  The Criminal Law provides little in the way of guidance as to what type of conduct 
qualifies as serious or very serious; such specifics are generally provided in subsequent judicial 
interpretations. 
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that seeks to be lenient thus can assign a sentence at the bottom of the range for 
the offense, referred to as congqing, or lightening the sentence.91 
In certain cases, a court may also issue a sentence below the minimum for a 
specific crime set forth in the Criminal Law, referred to as jianqing, or 
mitigating a sentence.92 A court may decide to convict a defendant but exempt 
the defendant from punishment, referred to as mianchuchufa.93 In cases of 
minor crimes, courts may also determine that the conduct in question did not 
constitute a crime.94 In addition, the Criminal Law states that defendants who 
are sentenced to terms of three years or less may be granted suspended sentences 
if they do not pose a threat to society.95 Taken together, these provisions mean 
that Chinese courts have a very high level of discretion in sentencing.96 
In addition to the Criminal Law, the SPC has provided guidance to lower 
courts regarding leniency and the use of suspended sentences, stipulating that 
defendants sentenced to three years in prison or less may receive suspended 
sentences or be exempt from punishment.97 In practice this means that 
defendants convicted of a crime for which the maximum sentence is three years 
or less are eligible for suspended sentences, as are those convicted of a more 
serious offense who are given only a three-year sentence. The Henan High 
People’s Court has issued its own sentencing guidelines, which add detail to 
those issued by the SPC.98 Generally speaking, in Henan defendants sentenced 
to three years or less are divided into two categories. Court rules state that 
suspended sentences should be given to minors, pregnant women, or persons 
 
 91.  For examples of provisions discussing situations giving rise to lighter sentences or 
exemption from punishment, see Criminal Law, supra note 89, arts. 7, 10, 17, 18, 19, 22, 29, 65. For 
a more detailed discussion of how sentencing works in practice, see Li Li, Nulla Poena Sine Lege in 
China: Rigidity or Flexibility?, 43 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 655, 658 (2010). 
 92.  For example, see 2012 Criminal Procedure Law, supra note 6, arts. 20, 21, 24, 28, 68. A 
number of provisions in the Criminal Law give courts the discretion to lighten or to mitigate a 
sentence. 
 93.  See, e.g., id. arts. 24, 67, 351. 
 94.  1996 Criminal Procedure Law, supra note 6, arts. 13, 15. 
 95.  Id. art. 72. Revisions to the law in 2011—after the cases examined in this article were 
decided—added greater specificity to article 72. Such changes were largely consistent with the 
judicial interpretations discussed below, see infra note 98, that were applicable in 2010.  
 96.  The limited scholarship on sentencing in English has generally emphasized this discretion. 
See, e.g., Li Li, supra 91, at 658–63. 
 97.  See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Liangxing Zhidao Yijian (最高人民法院量刑指导意见（试行) 
[Supreme People’s Court Opinion on Criminal Sentencing Guidelines (Provisional)] (promulgated 
by the Sup. People’s Ct., Sep. 13, 2010), available at http://www.xingshi110.com/xingfafagui/17082
.html. 
 98.  Henan Sheng Gaoji Renmin Fayun Renmin Fayuan Liangxing Zhidao Yijian (Shixing) 
Shishi Xize (河南省高级人民法院《人民法院量刑指导意见（试行）》实施细则) [Implementation 
Provisions of the Henan High People’s Court’s Criminal Sentencing Guidelines (Provisional)] 
(promulgated by the Henan High People’s Ct., effective Oct. 1, 2010), available at 
http://www.lawtime.cn/article/lll38346403839734oo28122 [hereinafter Supreme People’s Ct. 
Guideline on Sentencing (Provisional)] (stating that defendants qualify for a suspended sentence 
when they are given a sentence of three years or less and meet other specified provisions).  
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over seventy-five.99 For all others, the imposition of a suspended sentence is 
discretionary and is determined by a range of factors relating to the defendant’s 
conduct. Judges say it is official policy in Henan for courts to try suspending 
sentences in cases where the statutory sentence is three years or less.100 Yet the 
policy grants significant discretion to local courts; as a result, actual practice at 
the local level varies.101 
Until recently formal law did not authorize courts to base sentencing 
determinations on whether a defendant had paid compensation to her or his 
victim. Nevertheless, the practice emerged and spread throughout the 2000s, in 
particular following a 2010 notice from the SPC concerning implementation of 
the Combining Severity with Leniency policy. The notice stated that 
reconciliation in criminal cases helped to resolve future cases and prevent 
petitioning.102 In the SPC’s 2010 annual work report to the National People’s 
Congress, the SPC noted the value of mediating compensation agreements in 
cases where defendants received suspended death sentences.103 China’s revised 
Criminal Procedure Law, which became effective on January 1, 2013, explicitly 
authorizes the use of criminal settlement procedures in specific circumstances. 
These include crimes arising out of private disputes punishable by three years 
imprisonment or less and crimes of negligence punishable by seven years 
imprisonment or less.104 At the time of the cases examined in this Article, 
 
 99.  Id. ch. 2, art. 3, para. 7 (stating that defendants who are sentenced to three years or less 
and who meet other specified preconditions may have their sentences suspended); Interview 2012-
25. 
 100.  Interview 2012-25; Henan Fayuan Ni Tui “Huanxing Yugao Shu” Zhi 
(河南法院拟推”缓刑预告书”制) [Henan Courts Plan to Extend Suspended Sentence Advance Notice 
Policy], HENAN PINDAO (河南频道) [HENAN CHANNEL] (Aug. 13, 2009), 
http://henan.people.com.cn/news/2009/08/13/411406.html. 
 101.  Interview 2012-26. Supreme People’s Ct. Guideline on Sentencing (Provisional), supra 
note 98, ch. 2, art. 3, para. 6. The Criminal Law provides only rough guidelines regarding when a 
defendant who has been sentenced to three years or less of detention may be given a suspended 
sentence: when the circumstances of the crime are light, when the defendant has shown remorse, 
when there is no risk of reoffending, and when there would be no negative effects on the local area 
from a suspended sentence. Criminal Law, supra note 89, arts. 72–77. 
 102.  Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Yinfa Guanyu Guanche Kuanyan Xiangji Xingshi Zhengce de 
Ruogan Yijian de Tongzhi (最高人民法院印发《关于贯彻宽严相济刑事政策的若干意见》的通知) 
[Notice of the Supreme People’s Court on Issuing Some Advice on Implementing the Criminal 
Policy of Combining Leniency with Strictness] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Feb. 8, 2010), 
available at http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=310425. For a description of the 
emergence of the practice of settlement in criminal cases in the late 2000s, see Rosenzweig et al., 
The 2012 Revision of the Criminal Procedure Law: (Mostly) Old Wine in New Bottles 21–32 (CRJ 
Occasional Paper, 2012). 
 103.  The SPC emphasized the importance of courts’ not immediately carrying out death 
sentences in order to allow for victims’ families and defendants’ to reach a settlement and thus 
“reduce social contradictions.” Zuigao fa: Yange Zhangwo He Tonyi Sixing Shiyong Biaozhun 
(最高法：严格掌握和统一死刑适用标准) [Supreme Court: Death Penalty Strictly Controlled and 
Subject to Uniform Standards], XINHUA WANG (新华网) [XINHUA] (May 25, 2011), 
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/220005/222646/14738739.html. 
 104.  2012 Criminal Procedure Law, supra note 6, arts. 277–79. For an analysis of the new 
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however, China’s Criminal Procedure Law did not authorize courts to consider 
compensation agreements as factors influencing sentences. 
The promotion of settlement in criminal cases followed a general renewed 
emphasis on mediation in China’s courts in the early 2000s. Embrace of the 
practice reflected the belief that mediated cases were less likely to result in 
escalation, protest, and petitioning from victims or defendants (or their families). 
The policy also reflected resource concerns in the criminal justice system 
resulting from increased numbers of criminal cases and the belief than many 
minor offenders, in particular first offenders convicted of nonviolent crimes, did 
not need to be incarcerated. 
In this Article I use the term “leniency” to refer to two specific phenomena 
in China’s courts: the widespread use of suspended sentences, in some cases 
even for defendants facing a sentence in excess of three years, and the decision 
to give a suspended death sentence or life imprisonment to a defendant whose 
conduct made him or her eligible for the death penalty. My focus is thus on the 
actual sentences courts grant, not on the legal provisions concerning leniency. 
My findings provide evidence of how the policy is being implemented at 
the local level and suggest that local courts’ embrace of leniency and settlement 
exceeds national policy. Judges in Henan stated that they try to be lenient where 
they can, in particular in cases involving minor crimes, crimes committed by 
youths or students, crimes committed within a family, cases involving 
defendants who turn themselves in, and cases in which a family member turns in 
a relative.105 As one judge explained, if “cases come from ordinary lives” then 
 
provisions, including controversy leading up to their adoption, see Rosenzweig et al., supra note 
102, at 21–32. The revised law also explicitly states that in such cases the procuratorate may 
recommend that a defendant receive a lenient sentence or be exempt from punishment. 2012 
Criminal Procedure Law, supra note 6, art. 279. Prior to the revision, the 1996 Criminal Procedure 
Law authorized settlement only in cases involving private prosecutions. 1996 Criminal Procedure 
Law, supra note 6, art. 172.  
 105.  Official reports list seven categories of cases in which courts ordinarily should issue 
suspended sentences in Henan: defendants who take appropriate action to minimize harm; minors; 
deaf, mute, blind or disabled defendants who lack the ability to harm society; those who terminate 
their crime; those who turn themselves in or engage in meritorious service after the crime; those who 
assist in cracking a case; and those who commit crimes of negligence. In an additional five 
categories of cases, courts in Henan have the discretion to issue suspended sentences: those who 
commit intentional crimes in which there is little negative intent; those who actively repay stolen 
goods; those who actively pay compensation to victims; those who pay fines in advance; and those 
who turn themselves in, confess, or otherwise engage in conduct stipulated in law as a basis for 
leniency. The policy also specifically excludes certain defendants from eligibility for suspended 
sentences: defendants who fail to confess, fail to show remorse, or cause serious harm; defendants 
who have “despicable motivations”; defendants who use the proceeds of crimes to engage in other 
illegal conduct; defendants who take part in a collective crime whose conduct is serious or who 
commit multiple crimes; defendants with a prior criminal record or who have been subject to 
administrative sanction two or more times in the past; defendants whose crime involves the use of 
national relief funds or materials or whose crimes otherwise have serious characteristics. Similarly, 
defendants whose crimes are subject to punishment of a minimum of three years or more will not be 
eligible for a suspended sentence unless they have surrendered or engaged in other legally stipulated 
basis for leniency. Defendants whose crimes are to be punished by a sentence of five years or more 
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courts will try to be lenient, even if there is no formal legal basis for doing so.106 
Likewise, courts may seek to be lenient in cases where a victim was partially at 
fault, such as in intentional injury cases arising from fights.107 
Judges acknowledged some flexible adaptation of the SPC’s official policy. 
Henan courts often impose suspended sentences for crimes that ordinarily would 
result in a three-to-seven-year sentence, for example sentencing the defendant to 
three years and then suspending the sentence. Some observers suggested that the 
policy was in tension with the SPC’s intent that suspended sentences be used 
only for minor crimes,108 although technically the SPC rules do permit the use 
of a suspended sentence for those sentenced to three years for a crime for which 
the legally stipulated range is three to seven years. 
The 177 county court decisions in my dataset resulted in criminal 
convictions for 273 individual defendants, 219 of whom were given criminal 
sentences. Sixty-nine percent of these sentences, 152 sentences, were suspended 
sentences, meaning that defendants spent no time in prison following the 
judgment. An additional 53 defendants received only fines or were sentenced to 
detention or control.109 Many others who received a sentence received a 
relatively short one. The median sentence for such defendants was three years, 
reflecting the fact that most county court cases concerned relatively minor 
crimes. Cases that resulted in suspended sentences generally involved first-time 
offenders charged with relatively minor crimes such as fights, traffic offenses 
 
are only eligible for a suspended sentence if there is a legal basis for reducing their sentence to three 
years or below. Henan Fayuan Nitui “Huanxing Yugao Shu” Zhi (河南法院拟推”缓刑预告书”
制 ) [Henan Courts Plan to Apply Suspension Advance Notice Policy], HENAN PINDAO (河南频道) 
[HENAN CHANNEL] (Aug. 13, 2009), http://henan.people.com.cn/news/2009/08/13/411406.html. An 
article by a judge in the Henan provincial capital, Zhengzhou, provided some additional details as to 
how judges apply the policy. Qianxi “Huanxing Yugaoshu” De Sifa Jiazhi (浅析”缓刑预告书”
的司法价值 ) [A Brief Analysis of Suspension Advance Notice’s Judicial Value], HENAN FAYUAN 
WANG (河南法院网 ) [HENAN COURT NET] (Aug. 17, 2009), http://hnfy.chinacourt.org/article/ 
detail/2009/08/id/746727.shtml. The judge noted seven types of cases in which suspended sentences 
are used: traffic accidents and other crimes of negligence; minor crimes involving students at 
universities or other schools; minor crimes by juveniles; cases of minor harm to persons, serious 
harm resulting from negligence, serious harm with an “antecedent,” or cases of harm to property or 
other economic harm in which the defendant actively agrees to pay compensation; minor crimes to 
property such as theft; criminal disputes resulting from disputes among neighbors or family 
members; and cases involving crimes of negligence, accomplices, those who terminate their crimes, 
who turn themselves in, or in which the defendant engages in meritorious service or takes 
preventative action or action to minimize the harm. Id. 
 106.  Interview 2012-25.  
 107.  Id.  
 108.  Id. 
 109.  Detention refers to a short sentence, not to exceed one year, administered by the police in 
a police-run detention facility, not a prison. In theory those sentenced to detention have greater 
liberty than those sentenced to prison. Criminal Law, supra note 89, arts. 42–44. Control, sometimes 
also translated as “public surveillance,” refers to defendants who are not incarcerated but have their 
movements monitored by the police and who must obtain police permission for a range of activities. 
Id. arts. 1, 38–41; Cases B49, B184, B187, and B189 (explaining that four defendants received 
detention and a fine, all for theft). 
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resulting in personal injury, and low-value thefts. Most outcomes appear 
consistent with the SPC’s instructions on balancing severity and leniency. 
Yet the leniency apparent in cases in the dataset appears to go beyond that 
announced in official policy. Numerous cases that one might expect to result in 
incarceration under China’s Criminal Law instead resulted in suspended 
sentences. Thus, for example, the dataset includes multiple traffic crime cases in 
which a drunk driver caused a fatality or fatalities but received only a suspended 
sentence, despite the Criminal Law specifying a sentence range of three to seven 
years.110 Other cases involved violent conflict with local authorities that 
nevertheless resulted in suspended sentences, including a defendant who drew a 
knife on local officials seeking to seize counterfeit cigarettes111 and a case in 
which a villager attacked a local birth planning official in his home with an 
axe.112 Likewise, the county court granted suspended sentences in a case 
involving arson113 and in four separate cases involving corruption by local 
officials,114 the largest of which involved the theft of 70,000 yuan.115 The 
practice of granting leniency in cases involving corruption by officials appears 
directly in conflict with an SPC notice on the policy of balancing leniency and 
severity, which explicitly called for strict punishment for crimes involving 
official malfeasance.116 In another case, defendants convicted of manufacturing 
and selling low-quality (presumably fake) fertilizer received suspended 
sentences. Although the court found that their crime had yielded 120,000 yuan 
in profit and caused 340,000 yuan in harm, it nevertheless gave defendants a 
suspended sentence in a simplified trial.117 
Settlement with the victim or victim’s family appeared to be the most 
significant factor that led courts to impose lenient sentences. Sixty-eight of the 
county court cases reported settlements with victims or their families; another 
fourteen cases reported payment of restitution or compensation in cases not 
involving personal injury; and thirty cases reported the return of stolen goods.118 
Fifty-eight of the cases in which defendants paid victims mentioned that 
 
 110.  See, e.g., Case B193 (deciding that sentences be suspended, despite multiple fatalities). 
 111.  Case B153. 
 112.  Case B55 (illustrating that the defendant had argued and fought with the official earlier in 
the day, apparently when the official visited defendant’s home in the course of his duties as the local 
birth planning official).  
 113.  Case B91. 
 114.  Cases B104, B169, B199, and B213. 
 115.  Case B199. In contrast, a defendant in a credit card fraud case who was convicted of 
stealing 10,000 yuan received six years in prison and was fined 60,000 yuan. Case B142. 
 116.  Notice of the Supreme People’s Court on Issuing Some Advice on Implementing the 
Criminal Policy of Combining Leniency with Strictness, supra note 102, art. 8. 
 117.  Case B130 (demonstrating that the defendants had surrendered and had assisted the police 
in locating other criminals). 
 118.  Cases B179 and B187 (mentioning restitution, specifically). See, e.g., Cases B61, B70, 
B144, and B156 (discussing return of goods or repayment to victim).  
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defendants had “obtained the forgiveness of” victims or family members, and 
court decisions explicitly discussed compensation to families as a basis for a 
suspended sentence.119 Although some in China have drawn parallels between 
reconciliation in criminal cases and models of restorative justice elsewhere, the 
Chinese system relies almost entirely on direct payment to victims and their 
families as a direct factor justifying mitigation of a sentence. 
Settlement cases were largely made of up cases resulting from traffic 
accidents and fights. Because compensation determinations in criminal cases 
come through attached civil compensation claims, compensation levels should 
correspond to compensation in tort cases. In practice, however, settlement 
values ranged widely, and it is difficult to discern whether settlement amounts 
correspond to amounts potentially available in tort. The largest settlement, in a 
case involving multiple fatalities, was 370,000 yuan.120 The court found the 
defendant to have been drunk and to have fled the scene, which would 
potentially have exposed the defendant to a sentence in excess of seven years. 
After paying the compensation to the victims’ families, the defendant received 
only a three-year sentence, which was suspended for five years, resulting in no 
prison time.121 Defendants received suspended sentences in virtually all county 
court cases involving settlements. 
Yet the number of settlements in the county I studied may actually be low 
compared to elsewhere in Henan: settlement rates in criminal cases at some first-
instance courts in Henan reached eighty or ninety percent.122 One lawyer 
commented that the actual practice of settlements in Henan extends far beyond 
what is authorized in law: “the reality of practice exceeds real life.”123 
 
 119.  Case B1. 
 120.  Case B193. 
 121.  Case B193 (demonstrating that the defendant may also have been helped by his status as 
deputy director of the local family planning bureau, and as son of a local official).  
 122.  Interview 2012-17. 
 123.  Interview 2012-7. See also Henan Xinmi Tui Peichang Baozhengjin, Qingzui Xianfan 
Jiaoqian Ke Mianyu Pibu (河南新密推赔偿保证金 轻罪嫌犯交钱可免于批捕 ) [Xinmi, 
Henan Adopts Compensation Deposits, Misdemeanor Suspects Can Pay to Avoid Arrest], FAZHI 
RIBAO (法制日报 ) [LEGAL DAILY] (Aug. 23, 2010), http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/zbzk/content 
/2010-08/23/content_2253710.htm (stating that for minor crimes, defendants may be able to provide 
a “compensation guarantee payment” to the police and thus avoid being formally arrested by the 
procuratorate, and that the policy was the explicit reaction to the overuse of compulsory measures 
against defendants charged with minor crimes); Henan Sheng Jiancha Jiguan Yi Nian Hejie 6433 An 
(河南省检察机关一年和解6 43 3案 ) [Henan Procuratorate Settled 6433 Cases in One Year], 
FAZHI RIBAO (法制日报 ) [LEGAL DAILY] (Mar. 28, 2010), http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/zbzk/ 
content/2010-04/30/content_2129568.htm (stating that seventy five percent of the cases in Henan in 
2009 involved sentences of three years or less; sixty-eight percent of these defendants received a 
suspended sentence, a sentence of control or detention, were exempt from criminal punishment, or 
were subject only to a fine; the procuracy also reported resolving approximately ten percent of cases 
through mediation before going to court, a total of 6433 cases involving 7622 people in 2009); 
Henan Geji Fayuan YiNian Tiaojie Jiean 221732 Jian (河南各级法院一年调解结案2 2 1 73 2
件 ) [Henan Courts Mediated 221732 Cases in One Year], FAZHI RIBAO (法制日报 ) [LEGAL 
DAILY] (Mar. 16, 2010), http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/zbzk/content/201004/30/content_2129568.ht
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My dataset also includes a number of cases in which defendants convicted 
of relatively minor crimes did not receive a suspended sentence, apparently at 
least in part because the defendant did not reach a settlement with the victim. 
Thus, for example, defendant Wang Xisheng was sentenced to a year in prison 
following a fight that caused minor injury to a neighbor. The two parties were 
unable to reach a settlement and the court sentenced Wang to prison, in contrast 
with other cases involving fights in my dataset where the defendants settled and 
received only suspended sentences.124 In one of the two traffic crime cases that 
resulted in a prison sentence, defendant Liu Tao failed to come to the immediate 
assistance of his alleged victims after an accident that left two people riding an 
electric bicycle dead and a third injured, and also failed to compensate his 
victims. The court found his conduct involved “particularly bad circumstances,” 
thus warranting a five-year jail sentence.125 The court explicitly stated that the 
failure to compensate the victims’ families was a factor justifying a heavier 
sentence.126 The other defendant sentenced to prison in a traffic crime case was 
a recidivist who received an effective sentence of eight months. All other traffic 
crime cases involved both settlement and compensation.127 
Particularly unlucky were those defendants who had spent the proceeds of a 
crime and thus were not able to pay restitution. For example, although the 
dataset includes a number of cases involving motorcycle thefts where the 
 
m (discussing emphasis on mediation in Henan courts generally and a nearly fifty percent increase in 
the percentage of cases mediated); Yang Tao, “Xingshi Hejie” Zhong Faguan Buneng Dang 
Heshilao (刑事和解”中法官不能当和事佬 ) [Judges Cannot Be the Peacemakers in Criminal 
Settlement], FAZHI RIBAO (法制日报 ) [LEGAL DAILY] (Sep. 27, 2012), 
http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/Frontier_of_law/content/2012-09/27/content_3872770.htm (noting 
that China’s new Criminal Procedure Law restricts the use of mediation in criminal cases to specific 
categories and discussing the risk that mediation will be overused or forced on parties by courts 
seeking quick resolution of even serious criminal cases); “Xingshi Hejie” Xingui: Furen Ke Jiao 
Fakuan Qiongren Zhineng Zuolao? (刑事和解”新规 :富人可交罚款穷人只能坐牢 ?) [New 
Rules of Criminal Settlement: The Rich Can Pay Fine, While the Poor Can Only Go to Prison?], 
FAZHI RIBAO (法制日报 ) [LEGAL DAILY] (Sep. 27, 2012), http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/commen 
tary/content/2012-09/27/content_3873374.htm (discussing concerns that emphasis on settlements in 
criminal cases will favor the rich). 
 124.  Case B95. 
 125.  Case B5 (illustrating that the defendant had apparently pledged to compensate a small 
amount, 5400 yuan, but had defaulted on compensation payment). 
 126.  Case B5. No provision in the criminal law authorizes the imposition of heavier sentence to 
defendants who fail to compensate. In Case I3, the court affirmed that a three-year sentence for a 
defendant in a traffic accident. Although the defendant had paid compensation, defendant had 
apparently not obtained forgiveness of victim’s family. Although defendant requested leniency, 
defendant’s lawyer contested guilt on appeal. See also Cases B5 and B98 (demonstrating the only 
two cases that had no suspended sentence arising from a traffic crime). Cases B1, B4, B7, B9, B12, 
B16, B27, B42, B71, B87, B103, B112, B120, B128, B129, B134, B154, B170, B180, B181, B193, 
B205, B206, B207, B216, and B220 are examples of cases resulting in suspended sentences.  
 127.  Only Cases B5 and B98 had no suspended sentence in a case arising from a traffic crime. 
Cases B1 B4 B7, B9, B12, B16, B27, B42, B71, B87, B103, B112, B120, B128, B129, B134, B154, 
B170, B180, B181 B193, B205, B206, B207, B216 and B220 were traffic crime cases resulting in 
suspended sentences. 
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defendants returned the stolen goods and received suspended sentences, it also 
includes cases such as that of Hou Yunchang who stole a pig and motorcycle 
and wound up in prison, both because he fled after the crime and because he was 
apparently unable to pay restitution.128 In another case involving motorcycle 
thefts, two defendants were treated differently because one had sold, and thus 
not returned, a stolen motorcycle, while the other defendant had returned all the 
stolen motorcycles.129 
Although somewhat less pronounced in influence, intermediate court cases 
suggest that settlements are likewise important both in first-instance trials in the 
intermediate court and in appeals. Eleven defendants who were tried in the 
intermediate court and convicted of murder or of intentional injury leading to 
death received either life sentences, suspended death sentences, or fixed terms of 
imprisonment after paying compensation to victims’ families. In at least one of 
these cases the court explicitly stated that it was imposing a life sentence, 
presumably instead of death, because the defendant had compensated the 
victim’s family and had “obtained the understanding” of the family.130 In 
another case, a defendant who killed someone in a fight but confessed and paid 
compensation received a fifteen-year sentence, while a defendant in another case 
who contested the allegations and failed to pay compensation received life in 
prison.131 In a third case, a defendant convicted of the kidnapping and killing of 
a child was sentenced to life in prison despite the Criminal Law specifying the 
death penalty for a killing in the course of a kidnapping. The court noted that the 
defendant had settled and had surrendered.132 
Settlement was also an important factor in cases in which sentences were 
revised on appeal to the intermediate court. As discussed below, 27 defendants 
(out of a total of 442 defendants in the cases on appeal to the intermediate court) 
had their sentences reduced by the intermediate court, mostly because of 
settlements subsequent to the initial trial. Judges confirm that settlements may 
result in reduced punishment in some serious cases and that settlements of cases 
subsequent to first-instance verdicts may lead the intermediate court to revise 
sentences on appeal.133 
 
 128.  Case B62. 
 129.  Case B19. 
 130.  See Case I14a (explaining that a codefendant received a fixed term sentence because he 
paid compensation and assisted in capturing the primary defendant).  
 131.  Cases I27b, I28b. 
 132.  Case I5a. Article 239 of China’s Criminal Law states that a defendant who kills another 
person in the course of a kidnapping shall be sentenced to death. Criminal Law, supra note 89, art. 
239. As Margaret Lewis has noted, a surge in suspended death sentences has in recent years also 
resulted in public questioning of whether corruption is playing a significant role in courts’ decisions 
to grant suspended death sentence instead of the death penalty. Lewis, supra note 85, at 325–26. One 
commentator at a presentation of this Article in China noted that victim’s families in murder cases 
often have the choice of accepting compensation or having the defendant executed.  
 133.  Interview 2012-19. 
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In interviews, judges confirm that compensation is an important factor 
determining outcomes, in particular in relatively minor cases, such as traffic 
crimes leading to injury, theft, and assault.134 Compensation claims may be 
resolved privately or through the resolution of civil claims attached to criminal 
cases. For example, intermediate court judges reported that, in general, roughly 
half of their first-instance cases have civil cases attached to them and that half of 
these are resolved through settlement. Other cases may be resolved though 
settlements outside of court.135 Cases can be settled at any point in the criminal 
process, including after courts have issued their decisions,136 although in 
practice it appears that courts often wait to see if cases are resolved via 
reconciliation before issuing their judgments. 
Compensation also affects outcomes in capital cases. Lawyers state that in 
capital cases, settlement agreements can make the difference between death and 
a suspended death sentence137: to avoid the death penalty, a defendant must pay 
compensation.138 One lawyer directly linked the recent decline in executions in 
China and the emphasis on mediating outcomes in criminal cases. 139 
Judges (and procurators and police) at times play active roles in settlement 
negotiations,140 reflecting their strong interest in having cases resolved through 
payment of compensation. As one judge noted, “we work very hard to try to 
resolve cases via settlement.”141 Court efforts to settle will often be guided by 
the amounts potentially available in civil cases,142 and courts explain relevant 
standards governing compensation in order to persuade victims to accept 
compensation.143 Judges say they question victims or their family members to 
ensure they are satisfied with compensation agreements and in some cases add 
money to the agreed amount.144 Such efforts are guided by the belief that 
 
 134.  Interview 2012-17. 
 135.  Interview 2012-19. 
 136.  Interview 2012-12; Interview 2012-18. 
 137.  Interview 2012-23. 
 138.  Interview 2013-5. 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  Interview 2012-6; Interview 2013-11; Chen Ruihua: Xingshi Susong De Sili Hezuo Moshi 
(陈瑞华：刑事诉讼的私力合作模式) [Chen Ruihua: Integration of Private Remedy into Criminal 
Litigation], FAZHI RIBAO (法制日报) [LEGAL DAILY] (Nov. 1, 2010), 
http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/fxy/content/2010-11/01/content_2335275.htm (discussing prevalence 
of negotiated outcomes in criminal cases in Beijing and noting success at avoiding petitions; 
Xingsufa Shishi Zhong De Zhongdian Nandian Wenti (刑诉法实施中的重点难点问题) [Key Points 
and Difficulties in Application of Criminal Procedure Law], FAZHI RIBAO (法制日报) [LEGAL 
DAILY] (Jan. 9, 2013), http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/Frontier_of_law/content/201301/09/content_41
19385_2.htm (discussing preference of procurators and police for mediating criminal cases during 
the trial stage). 
 141.  Interview 2013-9. 
 142.  Interview 2012-26. 
 143.  Interview 2013-11. 
 144.  Id. 
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settlement works. 145 As another judge noted, settlements reduce contradictions 
and the possibility of escalation; thus, judges “want a settlement.”146 
Judges describe their roles as neutral actors seeking to ensure that the rights 
of victims are protected. Yet, it is clear that in some cases, courts place pressure 
on both sides of a case to agree to a mediated outcome.147 Lawyers contend that 
defendants are sometimes under extreme pressure to pay compensation to 
victims, with trials delayed to encourage settlement.148 Judges confirm that 
courts sometimes pressure defendants to settle, noting that criminal trials can be 
delayed for up to two months in cases in which a civil claim is attached to the 
criminal case.149 A few of the cases in the dataset involved delayed trials for 
minor crimes while a defendant remained in detention, suggesting that the court 
was attempting to encourage a settlement. In one case,150 the defendant was 
sentenced to eighteen months in jail for causing an injury in a fight between 
neighboring families. That defendant allegedly injured the neighbor by throwing 
a brick on his foot. The court initially delayed the trial by two months, 
apparently to encourage the two sides to mediate. When they failed to reach an 
agreement, the court ordered a relatively modest compensation of 3834 yuan, 
but also imposed an eighteen-month jail sentence. 
In the county court the average time from indictment by the procuracy to 
court decision was 32.2 days.151 Twenty-four cases152 took more than 45 days 
from indictment to court judgment; only eleven cases took more than 80 days. In 
these eleven cases, nine of the thirteen defendants eventually either paid 
compensation or some form of restitution, suggesting that ongoing settlement 
negotiations may have played a role in the delays. The court appeared to move 
relatively quickly to decide cases when a settlement seemed unlikely or 
impossible, with cases not involving a settlement being resolved more quickly 
 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Interview 2013-2. 
 147.  Xiayi Fayuan Jianli “Qixiang Jizhi” Tigao Zhixing Hejielü Chengxiao 
(夏邑法院建立”七项机制”提高执行和解率显成效) [Xiayi Court to Establish a “Seven Mechanism” to 
Improve the Implementation Rate of Paying off a Settlement], SHANGOIU FAYUAN WANG 
(商丘法院网) [SHANGQIU COURT WEB] (Jul. 13, 2009), http://hnsqzy.chinacourt.org/public/detail.ph
p?id=968; Langzhong Fayuan Suan Hao “Si Bi Zhang” Cujin Zhixing Hejie 
(阆中法院算好”四笔帐”促进执行和解) [Langzhong Court Considered “Four Accounts” to Facilitate 
the Implementation of Reconciliation], ZHONGGUO FAYUAN WANG (中国法院网) [CHINA COURT] 
(Aug. 19, 2010), http://old.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=424266; Pizhou Fayuan “Si Ge 
Qianghua” Zhua Hao Zhixing Hejie (邳州法院”四个强化”抓好执行和解) [Pizhou Court “Four 
Enhanced” Ensures Effective Enforcement of Settlement], ZHONGGUO FAYUAN WANG (中国法院网) 
[CHINA COURT] (May 12, 2011), http://old.pz.gov.cn/Htmls/News/mtkpz/JF28B04N066X4T60V6.h
tml. 
 148.  Interview 2012-6. 
 149.  Interview 2012-17. 
 150.  Case B115. 
 151.  The fastest case was decided 5 days after the filing of the indictment. The slowest case 
took 399 days. 
 152.  Cases B134, B215, B22, B112, B130, B193, B12, B163, and B106. 
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than those involving a settlement. The average time from indictment to decision 
in cases involving crimes against identifiable victims was 29.1 days for cases 
not involving settlements and 37.4 days for those with settlements. In the 
intermediate court, the average time from indictment to judgment was longer—
74 days. Yet some intermediate court cases also moved quickly from indictment 
to trial. For example, only 21 days elapsed from indictment to judgment for a 
defendant charged with fraudulently raising nearly 3 million yuan in capital. The 
defendant, who lacked legal representation, was sentenced to life in prison. 
It is also common for cases involving multiple defendants accused of the 
same crime to result in different sentences depending on whether the defendants 
paid compensation.153 Defendants who compensate victims often receive 
suspended or reduced sentences; those who do not receive prison terms.154 For 
example, a defendant convicted of intentional homicide had his sentence 
reduced on appeal from five years to four years after he paid 35,000 yuan in 
compensation to the victim’s family. The defendant had been part of a group 
that went to the victim’s home to pressure her to repay a gambling debt. The 
victim drank pesticide, killing herself in front of the defendants. The court 
affirmed a finding of intentional homicide for two of the defendants, but 
accepted one defendant’s argument that the sentence should be reduced in light 
of the compensation paid and the secondary role played by the defendant in the 
crime.155 In a companion case,156 three others who were convicted of 
participating in the same crime but who failed to pay compensation had their 
sentences affirmed.157 
Judges say they consider settlement offers even in cases in which victims 
reject such settlements,158 but it is impossible to verify this from the written 
judgments. Judges also say they take account of defendants who cannot pay,159 
although the cases do not provide evidence to support this claim. Judges say 
that, in general, defendants will borrow from friends and family in order to come 
up with money to pay compensation.160 In some cases courts may also provide 
funds to victims’ families from court assistance funds to encourage settlements, 
in particular where the defendant or defendant’s family has tried to settle but 
lacked adequate resources.161 Defendants also sometimes act strategically when 
 
 153.  Interview 2012-6. 
 154.  Id. 
 155.  Case I156. 
 156.  Case I14b. 
 157.  See also Case 6c (illustrating that defendants who settled received lighter sentences than 
codefendants who did not settle for beating corncob seller after motorcycle crashed on spilled 
corncobs). 
 158.  Interview 2012-17. 
 159.  Interview 2013-11 (noting that in cases in which a defendant lacks fund the court will 
seek to explain the situation to the victim or victim’s family). 
 160.  Interview 2013-11. 
 161.  Interview 2012-17. 
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it comes to organizing settlements: in one traffic accident case, the defendant 
fled after the accident and then waited to turn himself in until the two families 
had reached a settlement. He received a suspended sentence.162 
Cases that were not amicably resolved sometimes resulted in defendants 
receiving jail sentences even when they did pay compensation. Defendant Wang 
Xisheng was charged with willful injury after he punched his neighbor in the 
chest, causing “minor harm.”163 Wang did so after his neighbor dug a hole 
outside his house into which he fell. Wang agreed to compensate his neighbor 
7,000 yuan, an amount approved by the court. Nevertheless, he was sentenced to 
a year in prison. The court, while rejecting the victim’s demands for additional 
compensation, nevertheless decided that Wang deserved a prison sentence—in 
contrast to numerous other cases where defendants charged with crimes arising 
out of fights received only suspended sentences. 
Surrender and confession are also important factors affecting leniency, 
although the county court made clear that surrender must be useful to the 
authorities and confession must be truthful. Confession is a prerequisite to the 
imposition of a suspended sentence.164 The overwhelming majority of 
defendants confessed: 202 of the 273 defendants in the county court confessed at 
some point in the process. A small number of cases involved multiple 
defendants in which one defendant was treated more harshly than codefendants 
because of failure to confess.165 Helping victims after an accident was also a 
factor courts considered in imposing a lenient sentence.166 Informing on others 
and providing evidence of other crimes were also useful routes for those seeking 
leniency. Failure to surrender or to confess, in contrast, can lead to a heavier 
sentence. Thus, for example, a defendant who tried to escape after being 
detained was sentenced to four months for a minor crime that otherwise almost 
certainly would have resulted in a suspended sentence.167 
Some apparent lenient outcomes may reflect court and procuratorate 
attempts to adapt to local customs and expectations. Thus, for example, a 
defendant who attacked another person with an axe was prosecuted for 
attempted murder but was sentenced at the bottom of the specified range to 144 
months in the trial court. On appeal, the intermediate court reduced the sentence 
to 72 months. The defendant had acted in response to an attempt by the victim to 
“cure [the] defendant’s wife by superstitious means.” Prior to the attack, the two 
had argued with the victim stating that the defendant had offended the heavens 
 
 162.  Case B103. 
 163.  Case B95. 
 164.  Interview 2012-26. 
 165.  Case B73; Case B73. But see Cases B139, B113, and B79 (demonstrating that in 
additional cases longer sentences appeared to be based both on failure to settle and on the other 
defendant committing additional offenses).  
 166.  Case B154. 
 167.  Case B62. 
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and was cursed.168 In another example of both leniency and efforts to reconcile 
disputes among neighbors, the intermediate court affirmed a one-year sentence 
for a defendant for willful injury. The defendant was apparently a traditional 
healer who the court said used “witchcraft” to attempt to remove a serpent that 
she said was inside the victim. The victim was suffocated when the defendant 
compressed her neck and held her nose closed during the treatment. The 
defendant paid more than 100,000 yuan to the victim’s family prior to trial.169 
The one-year sentence appears low even considering the payment of 
compensation. 
The cases provide a window into the practice of leniency in Henan that 
likely is over- and underinclusive. Many cases settle during the investigation 
phase under the guidance of the procuratorate; these cases never proceed to 
court and thus do not appear in the dataset. Likewise many traffic cases that 
could potentially lead to criminal charges are settled by the police because 
charges are dropped once compensation is paid.170 Procurators say that it is 
common to drop charges for minor crimes when the defendant agrees to 
compensate the victim. Compensation agreements can also affect the criminal 
charge selected by the procuratorate.171 
Yet suspended sentences may not reflect leniency at all: some interviewees 
suggested that many suspended sentences reflect cases where defendants should 
never have been charged with or convicted of a crime in the first place. Chinese 
courts in criminal cases serve almost entirely as fora for determining sentences, 
not guilt. Courts are under enormous pressure to convict all defendants, and 
suspended sentences may thus be a proxy for cases where there is insufficient 
evidence to convict.172 Although most nonpublic cases involve juveniles, it is 
also possible that courts choose not to make certain cases public. 
Confession, surrender, and compensation are not the only factors affecting 
sentencing. Courts may also consider factors not stated in the opinion. For 
example, one judge noted that courts will often consider whether the defendant 
has children although the court may not put such reasoning into an opinion.173 
Additionally, suspended sentences may also reflect direct corruption.174 It is 
impossible to know how many such cases occur, but defense lawyers 
acknowledge that defendants can sometimes win suspended sentences through 
direct payments to judges.175 
 
 168.  Case I88a. 
 169.  Case I92a. 
 170.  Interview 2013-11. 
 171.  Interview 2013-12. 
 172.  Interview 2013-2. 
 173.  Interview 2013-8. 
 174.  Interview 2012-6. 
 175.  Id. 
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C. Overcriminalization and State Interests 
Despite the official embrace of leniency, the county court decisions also 
show that the criminal justice system continues to criminalize a wide range of 
minor conduct. Thus while many criminal defendants appear to be treated 
leniently, the county cases suggest that the criminal justice system handles a 
significant number of primarily civil disputes. Many of the cases appear to 
reflect the criminalization of tort disputes or business disputes, perhaps 
reflecting the difficulty of winning and enforcing a civil judgment. Hence the 
dataset includes numerous cases that involve fights among neighbors resulting in 
minor harm—in one case a fight resulting in minor harm to a finger—that 
become criminal cases.176 Such cases largely follow statutory guidelines, which 
impose sentences of up to three years for intentional harm resulting in minor 
injury. Nevertheless, the large volume of such cases appears in tension with 
efforts to mediate minor criminal matters. Settlement is encouraged, but even 
very minor crimes remain a concern of the State. Likewise, the cases include 
fairly routine traffic accidents—in one case caused by a wheel falling off a car—
that are treated as criminal matters.177Also, property disputes—in particular 
illegal use of land that does not belong to the defendant—were another source of 
criminal cases.178 China is not unique in criminalizing such conduct, but the 
cases reflect the long reach of the criminal justice system.179 Procurators and 
lawyers say that it is common for the criminal system to be used to resolve civil 
cases—in particular economic cases and disputes among neighbors.180 
The threat of criminal charges is at times used to extract compensation 
from an opposing party or used to force those who refuse to comply with civil 
cases to do so. This was most clear in a case in which a defendant was convicted 
and sentenced to a suspended sentence for refusing to pay a prior civil award for 
440,000 yuan resulting from a traffic accident. The court noted that the 
defendant had spent money decorating his house and purchasing household 
appliances despite claiming to lack resources to pay the judgment.181 
The cases also show that harsh punishments are imposed when core 
interests of the State are involved or where there are concerns about repeat or 
copycat crimes. Thus, the county court imposed long sentences for creating a tax 
 
 176.  Case B159. 
 177.  Case B134. 
 178.  Cases B17, B47, and B63. See also Case I69a, in which a dispute about use of land led to 
criminal charges for destruction of property. The court in that case ordered the defendant to pay forty 
percent of the victim’s damages. 
 179.  The cases also do not include defendants sentenced to reeducation through labor or other 
forms of administrative custodial detention.  
 180.  See, e.g., Interview 2013-7 (stating that it is easy to use criminal cases to resolve 
economic or business disputes). 
 181.  Case B195. 
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fraud scheme,182 stealing parts from highways,183 or stealing electrical wires or 
electrical installations belonging to the power grid or installations or materials 
belonging to telecommunications companies.184 Crimes involving threats of 
violence, guns, or trafficking of women and children were treated harshly.185 
One of the longest sentences in the county court was in a case involving 
defendants who created a company for the purposes of exporting labor to 
Singapore. The scheme involved charging victims a fee in exchange for 
promising to arrange work.186 The primary defendant received an eleven-year 
sentence.187 
Those with prior criminal records were likewise treated harshly, virtually 
always receiving criminal sentences regardless of the seriousness of the crime 
charged. Thus, a defendant in the intermediate court who was convicted of 
stealing 200,000 yuan in jewelry received a life sentence despite the fact that 
there was no suggestion of violence, apparently because of a prior conviction for 
theft.188 
Courts also are careful to ensure that sentences imposed generally exceed 
time held in pretrial detention, thus avoiding a suggestion that the procuratorate 
or police had erred in ordering that a defendant be detained. All of the 169 
county court defendants held in detention for a period prior to trial were found 
guilty, and most of them received criminal sentences that were equal to or 
greater than the time already served in detention. Yet 85 of these defendants had 
their sentences suspended, meaning they likely served no additional time in 
detention. Nevertheless, the imposition of a suspended sentence or fine (as 
opposed to a nonguilty verdict) also precluded a State compensation claim that 
the procuratorate or police had erred in their decisions to detain the defendants. 
D. High-Profile Issues 
The cases in this study provide insight into how the criminal justice system 
is being used to address a number of contentious social issues, including: 
corruption, land disputes, disputes related to social stability, and violent 
domestic disputes. They also provide details on crimes charged against women. 
 
 182.  Case B79 (holding that a defendant is sentenced to six years for selling fake value added 
tax certificates). 
 183.  Case B139. 
 184.  Cases B6, B14, and B157. 
 185.  See, e.g., Cases B133 and B2221 (holding that a crime of troublemaking and provocation 
for assault in which defendant stole twenty-five yuan deserved a five-month sentence); see also 
Cases B90, B32, and B94. 
 186.  The defendants were able to return only ten percent of the money collected. 
 187.  Case B161. 
 188.  Cases I29a (suspended sentence); Case I29b. 
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1. Corruption and Financial Crimes 
Six county court cases involve financial crimes relating to corruption: 
bribery,189 corruption,190 embezzlement,191 and misappropriation of public 
funds. In all but one of the cases, defendants received a suspended sentence.192 
In contrast, a number of defendants who were not State employees received 
significant sentences for financial crimes. Seventeen county court cases involved 
other forms of financial crime: fraud;193 contract fraud;194 credit card fraud;195 
extortion and blackmail;196 forgery or sale of State certificates or fake tax 
invoices;197 and illegal business activities.198 Sentences were suspended in only 
eight of these cases, with some defendants receiving sentences of up to thirteen 
years. Differences in sentencing may reflect underlying provisions in the 
Criminal Law and in the amount of money involved: Chinese law links 
sentences to the amount involved in financial crimes. A number of the contract-
fraud and financial-crime cases that resulted in criminal sentences involved large 
amounts of money, while the amounts involved in many of the official 
corruption cases were relatively small. More serious sentences were imposed in 
corruption and embezzlement cases tried in the intermediate court.199 
Nevertheless, the cases suggest the possibility that financial crimes 
involving State officials are treated more leniently than those committed by non-
State employees and that the criminal justice system is being used to resolve 
business disputes.200 In interviews, lawyers confirm that it is common for 
 
 189.  Case B70 (holding that a defendant policeman would receive a suspended sentence for 
accepting money in exchange for attempting to eliminate a criminal sentence). 
 190.  Case B169 (convicting sanitation bureau head for stealing 30,000 yuan by falsifying 
financial statements for his department); Case B123 (defendant adjusted electricity meters to collect 
more money). 
 191.  Case B104 (imposing three-year sentences, which were suspended for four years, for 
misappropriating 60,000 yuan in public funds); Case B203 (embezzled public funds by stealing from 
a rural health fund). 
 192.  The one defendant who did not receive a suspended sentence received a twelve-year 
sentence for embezzling more than 100,000 yuan from a local rural health fund. Case B203. The 
finding is not surprising: at numerous workshops in China at which I presented this paper there was 
general consensus that prior to 2013, officials convicted of corruption and related offenses generally 
were treated leniently unless their conduct was extremely serious. 
 193.  Cases B46, B61, B101, B144, B161, B202, B204, and B214. 
 194.  Cases B10, B88, and B209. 
 195.  Case B23. 
 196.  Cases B40, and B65 (both receiving suspended sentences).  
 197.  Cases B53, B210, and B79. 
 198.  Case B161.  
 199.  See, e.g., Case I6a (imposing a fifteen-year sentence for embezzling 3 million yuan 
intended to be used for relocation payments to villagers). 
 200.  Case I4A is another case in which a lower court appeared lenient toward a defendant 
charged with corruption. A county court convicted a police officer of abuse of power for extorting 
money but then ordered him exempt from punishment because the consequences were slight and the 
defendant had been subject to Party discipline. The procuratorate successfully objected and the 
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officials to receive comparatively lenient sentences, in particular when funds are 
returned.201 
Most of the cases studied involve low-ranking officials who received 
apparently lenient sentences. But one first-instance intermediate court case 
involved the prosecution of a county Party secretary, the highest ranking official 
at the county level, on forty-nine corruption counts, totaling more than 5 million 
yuan. The defendant, who argued that he acted in the public interest and that the 
funds were used to buy gifts for other officials, was sentenced to eighteen 
years.202 
2. Land Disputes 
A number of cases demonstrated the prevalence of land disputes in rural 
China in recent years, in some cases fights resulting from such disputes.203 
Three other cases were brought against defendants for illegal occupation or use 
of farmland, generally for use of land in ways not approved by the State or for 
using land that did not belong to the defendant.204 For example, two defendants 
were prosecuted for illegally selling sand from their land,205 in one case by 
digging a hole eleven meters deep.206 One case involved defendants prosecuted 
for beating villagers who refused to cooperate with a relocation order in 
conjunction with a land seizure. Defendants were sentenced to thirty months, 
with the intermediate court affirming a decision to treat defendants leniently 
because they had assisted other investigations.207 
3. Social Stability and Protest 
A few cases touched on issues concerning social stability, hinting at local 
unrest. One case in the county court involved an attack on a local high school by 
villagers, the result of an apparent dispute between two villages.208 A county 
 
intermediate court imposed a two-year sentence.  
 201.  Interview 2013-7. 
 202.  Cases I21a and B190. See also Case I70a, in which defendants were prosecuted for illegal 
detention after a group of villagers blocked access to police seeking to arrest a fellow villager. 
Although the defendants prevailed on an initial appeal, on retrial they were once again convicted. 
 203.  Case B106 (fighting arising from land dispute). 
 204.  Cases B17, B47, and B63. 
 205.  Cases B17 and B63. 
 206.  Case B17 (admonishing that the defendant had caused “serious deterioration to 
farmland”). In another case, a defendant was convicted of illegal use of farmland after opening a 
dairy. Case B47. Numerous other cases resulted from conflicts relating to land disputes. See, e.g., 
Case I7 (convicting defendant of cutting down neighbor’s trees after neighbor cut down defendant’s 
trees following contract dispute over land use rights). 
 207.  Case I83a. 
 208.  Case B190. See also Case I70a, in which defendants were prosecuted for illegal detention 
after a group of villagers blocked access to police seeking to arrest a fellow villager. Although the 
defendants prevailed on an initial appeal, on retrial they were once again convicted.  
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court case resulting from a labor dispute ended in convictions for employees 
charged with stealing crops.209 In another case, the intermediate court convicted 
a defendant for abuse of power for entering into a contract that resulted in 
massive financial losses to a hotel.210 The court’s opinion noted the deep 
unhappiness of the defendant’s employees, presumably from the resulting job 
losses. The case suggested that the prosecution was at least in part a response to 
a fear of labor unrest. 
In one case, the intermediate court affirmed a lower court sentence of five 
years for extortion. The defendant was unhappy about a separate decision in the 
lower court determining the amount of land assigned to the defendant and her 
family pursuant to a land use transfer agreement. She told the court that unless it 
paid her 1 million yuan, she would go to Beijing to protest. In response, the 
procuratorate brought criminal extortion charges.211 
Other cases showed how persistent petitioning affects the courts. In a case 
that began in 2002, defendants were convicted of disturbing public order after 
they allegedly organized a protest at local government offices. They served 
thirty months in prison. Upon their release, they began petitioning, seeking to 
have the judgment reversed. They eventually succeeded in convincing the 
provincial high court to order the case retried—but the county court once again 
found them guilty, and the intermediate court affirmed.212 
4. Female Defendants and Crimes Within the Family 
Court opinions provide only limited information about individual 
defendants: age, gender, and in some cases, education level and employment 
status. In the county court, 27 of the 273 defendants were women.213 In the 
intermediate court, 72 of 530 defendants were women, including 9 defendants in 
first-instance cases. The limited sample size makes generalizations about types 
of crimes committed or sentencing of women difficult. Women were prosecuted 
for crimes ranging from organized robbery to forgery to intentional harm and 
trafficking or abduction of women or children. Women involved in serious 
crimes, such as organized robbery, received sentences along the lines of their 
male accomplices or counterparts given the crimes charged, although there is 
some evidence that women were detained for shorter periods pretrial. Women 
involved in trafficking cases received harsher sentences than their male 
accomplices, but courts found that the women were the primary culprits in these 
 
 209.  Case B183.  
 210.  Case I26. 
 211.  Case I68 (demonstrating that, as the defendant had already been to Beijing to protest three 
previous times, she almost certainly drew the ire of the local court).  
 212.  Case B190. See also Case I70a, in which defendants were prosecuted for illegal detention 
after a group of villagers blocked access to police seeking to arrest a fellow villager. Although the 
defendants prevailed on an initial appeal, on retrial they were once again convicted. 
 213.  All but one of the remaining defendants were male; one defendant was a corporation. 
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cases, actually selling the women and children, as opposed to their male 
accomplices who received only suspended sentences for introducing the 
defendant women to buyers. 
Tables 5 and 6 list crimes with which women were charged in the county 
court and in first-instance intermediate court cases. 
TABLE 5: FEMALE DEFENDANTS IN THE COUNTY COURT BY CRIME 
SENTENCED 
Case Type Defendants Cases 
 
Organized robbery (聚众哄抢罪) 4 1  
Theft (盗窃罪) 3 3  
Forgery and/or sale of state authorities’ 
certificates (伪造、买卖国家机关证件罪) 
3 1  
Intentional injury (故意伤害罪) 3 3  
Abduction and trafficking of women (拐卖妇女
罪) 
2 1  
Concealment of illegal gains (掩饰、隐瞒犯罪所
得罪) 
4 4  
Abduction and trafficking of children (拐卖儿童
罪) 
1 1  
Bigamy (重婚罪) 1 1  
Disturbance of the peace (寻衅滋事罪) 1 1  
Fraud (诈骗罪) 1 1  
Gambling (赌博罪) 1 1  
Illegal sales of invoices (非法出售发票罪) 1 1  
Misappropriation of public funds (挪用公款罪) 1 1  
Traffic accident (交通肇事罪) 1 1  
Total 27 21  
Note: “Defendants” refers to the number of defendants charged with a particular 
crime. Defendants who are charged with more than one crime are counted 
multiple times.  
“Cases” refers to the number of cases in which a particular crime was charged. 
Cases with multiple charges are thus counted multiple times.  
TABLE 6: FEMALE DEFENDANTS IN FIRST-INSTANCE TRIALS IN THE 
INTERMEDIATE COURT 
Crime  Defendants Cases 
Credit card fraud (信用卡诈骗罪) 2 1 
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Concealment of stolen goods (掩饰，隐瞒犯罪所
得罪) 
1 1 
Intentional homicide(故意杀人罪) 1 1 
Receipt fraud (票据诈骗罪) 2 1 
Harboring criminals (窝藏罪) 3 2 
Drug trafficking (贩卖毒品罪) 1 1 
Loan fraud (贷款诈骗罪) 2 1 
Illegal manufacturing of explosives (非法制造爆炸
物罪) 
1 1 
Loan swindle (骗取贷款罪) 2 1 
Total 15 10 
Note: “Defendants” refers to the number of defendants charged with a particular 
crime. Defendants who are charged with more than one crime are counted 
multiple times.  
“Cases” refers to the number of cases in which a particular crime was charged. 
Cases with multiple charges are thus counted multiple times.  
A few cases likely reflect gender issues or potential bias. One female 
defendant was convicted of the crime of bigamy and sentenced to six months in 
prison after she began living with a man other than her husband.214 She argued 
that she had done so only after her husband had an affair with another woman. 
The criminalization of a routine domestic dispute strongly suggests that the 
criminal system was used to settle personal scores to the detriment of the female 
defendant. 
The dataset also confirms that courts are lenient in their handling of 
intrafamily crimes, including spousal killings. In one county court case, the 
court convicted the defendant of negligently killing a woman following a 
domestic argument.215 The defendant and the victim were living together, and 
the victim, who was married to another man, suffered from mental illness. The 
court reported that the two argued after drinking. The defendant left the woman 
to sleep on a concrete floor in an unheated room while wearing only her 
underwear and a coat. When she froze to death, the defendant received a six-
year sentence. The case was the only nontraffic accident case involving the 
death of a victim tried in the county court. All other cases involving death of the 
victim were treated more seriously and thus were tried in the intermediate court. 
Similar trends appear in the intermediate court cases. In another case, a 
defendant who killed his wife received a suspended death sentence. The court’s 
opinion emphasized the defendant’s unhappiness in his marriage, perhaps 
providing a basis for avoiding a death sentence.216 Another defendant who 
 
 214.  China’s Criminal Law criminalizes cohabitation with someone other than one’s spouse, 
but it provides that charges may only be brought by a private complaint. 
 215.  Case B167. 
 216.  Case I3a. The case had been decided twice previously by the intermediate court; each time 
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killed his wife was convicted of intentional injury, not murder, and was 
sentenced to just under ten years.217 In interviews, judges and lawyers confirm 
that serious crimes that occur within families, most notably the killing of a 
spouse, are treated leniently, with the death penalty virtually never imposed.218 
Not all assailants were male. One woman was convicted of homicide in the 
intermediate court for killing her husband by setting fire to a building and 
locking him inside. The defendant argued that she had intended to burn down 
the home of a woman she believed was having an affair with her husband. The 
court imposed a suspended death sentence, stating that it was acting leniently 
because the defendant had surrendered. But the court also argued that further 
leniency was not warranted, in part because the defendant failed to provide any 
evidence of an actual affair219—despite the fact that the killing had taken place 
in the other woman’s home. 
E. Lawyers and Legal Arguments 
Few of the defendants in the county court had lawyers or other legal 
representatives. This observation is not surprising: the lack of lawyers in 
criminal cases has been widely noted. Nevertheless, these cases show that it is 
common for defendants to be convicted with no legal representation. Also, the 
cases describe the types of arguments made by defendants and their lawyers at 
trial and on appeal. 
 
it was remanded for retrial by the provincial high court. It appears that the defendant had settled with 
the victim’s family, as the family had dropped their civil case as the case proceeded. 
 217.  Case I4c. In contrast, a defendant convicted of intentional homicide for choking his 
girlfriend to death received a suspended death sentence. Case I20. The fact that death-penalty cases 
are not made public makes comparisons difficult, but the apparent trend of avoiding death sentences 
in such cases is consistent with observations from local lawyers. In another case a defendant 
received a suspended death sentence for the intentional killing of his wife. The defendant explicitly 
argued that he should be treated leniently because the murder took place in a domestic dispute. Case 
I3a; see also Case I40 (imposing fifteen-year sentence for killing brother in a fight, after the lawyer 
argued for leniency because it was a family dispute, and after the victims’ family argued for 
leniency). Only one appeal to the intermediate court appeared to involve a domestic dispute. Case 
I141. In that case, the defendant’s husband assaulted his father-in-law, who had come following a 
fight between the husband and wife. Id. The victims appealed, arguing that compensation was too 
low and that the sentence was too short. Id. The procuratorate, however, did not participate in the 
appeal, suggesting a reluctance to become more deeply involved in the case. Id. In another appeal 
that reflected the interaction of gender roles and traditional values in the countryside, the court 
affirmed sentences of up to three years for robbery for a woman and her two sons after they 
allegedly detained and demanded money from their daughter/sister’s boyfriend. Case I103. They 
argued that he had forced them to lose a bride price by having sex with his girlfriend—and thus 
should pay compensation as a result. Id. Other crimes of passion likewise appeared to receive 
relatively lenient treatment. See, e.g., Case I47b (imposing fifteen-year sentence for willful injury for 
killing in a fight, where defendant, who had a prior record, suspected victim was having an affair 
with his girlfriend). 
 218.  Interview 2012-17. 
 219.  Case I9b. 
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Of the 273 defendants in the county court, only 48 defendants had a legal 
representative of any kind. Three defendants were represented by basic-level 
legal workers,220 and an additional 3 were represented by family members. The 
remaining 42 defendants were represented by lawyers. 
Representation rates in first-instance cases in the intermediate court were 
higher, reflecting the more serious charges faced by defendants in such cases.  
Of the 67 first-instance defendants, 50 were represented at trial; 49 of these were 
represented by lawyers.221 Rates of representation were much higher in the most 
serious cases. All of the 9 defendants sentenced to suspended death sentences 
had lawyers; 15 of the 20 defendants sentenced to life in prison had lawyers.222 
Cases on appeal to the intermediate court had lower rates of representation: 
only 123 of the 442 defendants in cases on appeal to the intermediate court had 
legal representation detailed in the court opinions.223 
Table 7 lists the cases by crime charged in which defendants in the county 
court were represented by lawyers. Table 8 presents similar data for the 
intermediate court. 
TABLE 7: COUNTY COURT CASES WITH LEGAL REPRESENTATION 
Crime Defendants Cases 
Theft (盗窃罪) 9 9 
Traffic accident (交通肇事罪) 7 7 
Concealment of illegal gains (掩饰、隐瞒犯罪所
得罪) 
4 4 
Dissemination of obscene materials (传播淫秽物品
罪) 
4 1 
Intentional injury (故意伤害罪) 4 4 




 220.  Basic level legal workers are State-licensed paraprofessionals, generally with limited legal 
training. Basic-level legal workers are authorized to represent clients in civil cases; they are not 
permitted to represent clients in criminal cases. 
 221.  The remaining defendant was represented by a family member.  
 222.  See, e.g., Case I6 (imposing against a woman, who was not represented by lawyer, a 
sentence of life in prison for drug trafficking); Case I9 (imposing against a defendant with no lawyer 
a sentence of life in prison for defrauding 2.92 million yuan). The 1996 Criminal Procedure Law 
mandated legal representation only in cases in which a defendant faced a potential death sentence or 
was blind, deaf, mute, or a minor. 1996 Criminal Procedure Law, supra note 6, art. 34.  
 223.  The cases specified that 128 defendants had legal representation, while 238 lacked 
representation. For an additional 86 defendants, the opinions provided no information. It is thus 
likely that the actual number with some form of legal representation was higher than 128—but 
nevertheless still significantly below half of the cases. Of 21 defendants in rehearing cases, 11 had 
legal representation. 
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Corruption (贪污罪) 2 2 
Fraud (诈骗罪) 2 2 
Illegal logging (滥伐林木罪) 2 1 
Abduction and trafficking of children (拐卖儿童罪) 1 1 
Bigamy (重婚罪) 1 1 
Contract fraud (合同诈骗罪) 1 1 
Disturbance of the peace (寻衅滋事罪) 1 1 
Embezzlement (职务侵占罪) 1 1 
Extortion and blackmail (敲诈勒索罪) 1 1 
Falsely issuing exclusive value-added tax invoices  
(虚开增值税专用发票罪) 
1 1 
Gambling (赌博罪); Illegal possession of guns (非
法持有枪支罪) 
1 1 
Illegal business act (非法经营罪) 1 1 
Destruction of electric equipment (破坏电力设备
罪) 
1 1 
Refusal to execute court decision (拒不执行法院判
决罪) 
1 1 
Total 50 43 
Note: Total number of cases with legal representation is 41. Two cases that 
involved multiple charges are counted twice under “cases.” Defendants are listed 
by the most serious crime charged.  
 TABLE 8: LEGAL REPRESENTATION IN FIRST-INSTANCE INTERMEDIATE 
COURT CASES 
 Crime  Defendants Cases Defendants 
with Legal 
Rep? 
Credit card fraud (信用卡诈骗罪) 3 1 3 
Selling counterfeit money (出售假币
罪) 
1 1 1 
Bribery (受贿罪)  1 1 1 
Contract fraud (合同诈骗罪) 2 2 2 
Robbery (抢劫罪) 5 2 5 
Misappropriation of public funds (挪
用公款罪) 
1 1 1 
Concealment of stolen goods (掩饰
，隐瞒犯罪所得罪) 
2 2 1 
Willful injury (故意伤害罪) 22 12 17 
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Intentional homicide (故意杀人罪) 10 9 10 
Theft (盗窃罪) 5 3 2 
Receipt fraud (票据诈骗罪) 3 1 3 
Harboring criminals (窝藏罪) 6 2 0 
Kidnapping (绑架罪) 1 1 1 
Fraud (诈骗) 1 1 1 
Drug trafficking (贩卖毒品罪) 4 2 3 
Corruption (贪污罪) 1 1 1 
Loan fraud (贷款诈骗罪) 3 1 3 
Fraudulent raising of capital (集资诈
骗罪) 
1 1 0 
Illegal manufacturing of explosives     
(非法制造爆炸物罪) 
3 1 3 
Loan swindle (骗取贷款罪) 3 1 3 
Total 78 46 61 
The county court cases also show that defendants and, where represented, 
their lawyers, were rarely effective when they contested guilt.224 Lawyers 
represented defendants in only five of the nine cases in which defendants 
contested guilt.225 In only one county case did the court indicate that it was 
accepting a defendant’s argument regarding guilt: in that case the court accepted 
the defendant’s argument that the evidence provided failed to support the 
procurator’s claim that the defendant had participated in one of four alleged 
thefts (the defendant was sentenced for the three other thefts).226 The court 
rejected defense arguments in the other eight cases in which a defendant or a 
lawyer contested guilt. 
Lawyers in Henan say that courts will generally, but not always, mention 
defense arguments in opinions.227 Thus, it is possible that some defense 
arguments are not reflected in the court opinions. Nevertheless, it is clear from 
the cases that acknowledging guilt is by far the most common strategy. 
The outcomes in the cases reflect a fact that is widely known: winning a 
nonguilty verdict is nearly impossible. No defendants in the county court cases 
received nonguilty verdicts. Three out of more than four hundred defendants in 
the intermediate court cases (including appeals and first-instance trials) received 
nonguilty verdicts. In one case, the intermediate court reversed a conviction by a 
 
 224.  Chinese criminal procedure does not bifurcate determinations of guilt and sentencing. 
Because a defendant generally must admit guilt in order to obtain leniency, defendants thus face the 
choice of contesting guilt and forgoing arguments for leniency or admitting guilt and arguing for 
leniency.  
 225.  Cases B5, B6, B20, B61, B161, B195, and B209.  
 226.  Case B26. A codefendant was convicted of all four of the thefts. 
 227.  Interview 2012-4. 
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lower court of a local village committee for illegal occupation of farmland. On 
appeal, the intermediate court found that criminal liability could not be imposed 
on the village committee. The intermediate court affirmed criminal judgments 
against the farmers who actually illegally occupied the land. In a second case, 
the intermediate court affirmed a nonguilty decision from a lower court in a 
malicious accusation case. Yet the case was a claim filed by a private individual, 
not the procuratorate, and thus did not reflect on the work of the procuratorate. 
In a third case, a trial court had acquitted defendants of intentional assault; on 
appeal, in response to a procuratorate’s objection, the court vacated and 
remanded. No first-instance trials in the intermediate court resulted in nonguilty 
verdicts. In interviews, judges and lawyers confirm the lack of nonguilty 
verdicts in criminal cases in Henan.228 
County court judgments almost always convicted defendants of the exact 
crimes charged by the procuratorate, differing from procuratorate charges in 
only two cases. In both cases the court convicted the defendant of an additional 
charge not alleged by the procuratorate.229 The intermediate court likewise 
convicted the defendant of the exact crime charged by the procuratorate in all 
sixty-four first-instance cases for which data are available. Yet contesting guilt 
may not be fruitless. Judges and lawyers also acknowledge that they have other 
strategies to deal with cases they view as incorrectly decided or lacking 
evidence. Judges say that they will not rule against the procuratorate because 
doing so would affect the career development of both procurators and police 
involved in the case. Instead, courts will “communicate [with the procuratorate] 
and work it out” if they find problems in cases.230 Courts may also impose 
suspended sentences or exempt defendants from punishment in order to avoid 
finding a defendant not guilty.231 Judges acknowledge mediating outcomes even 
in cases where there is insufficient evidence to convict.232 In other cases they 
 
 228.  Interview 2013-2 (stating that winning a nonguilty verdict is impossible, but that in some 
cases lawyers nevertheless have no option but to try). 
 229.  Case B23 (adding a charge of credit-card fraud to procuratorate charge of concealment of 
illegal gains); Case B80 (adding a charge of theft to procuratorate charge of illegal logging). 
 230.  Interview 2012-11; see also Interview 2012-4 (noting that courts are generally reluctant to 
offend the procuratorate). 
 231.  Interview 2012-7; Interview 2012-10. 
 232.  Interview 2012-26. For discussion of the issue, see Liu Wei, Wuzui Panjuelü Qudi De 
Beimian (无罪判决率趋低的背面) [Behind Low Rate of Non-Guilty Cases], MINZHU YU FAZHI 
SHIBAO (民主与法制时报) [DEMOCRACY AND LEGAL SYSTEM NEWS] (Oct. 29, 2012), 
http://www.mzyfz.com/cms/minzhuyufazhishibao/fanfu/html/1248/2012-10-29/content-552683.html 
(stating that court and procuracy evaluation standards directly overturn the presumption of innocence 
because they result in avoidance of nonguilty verdicts); Zhu Xiaoding, Shuzi Kan Zhongguo: Basan 
Nian Yilai Zuigao Fayuan Baogao Zhong De Xingshi Panjue Yu Wuzui Xuangao 
(数字看中国：八三年以来最高法院报告中的刑事判决与无罪宣告) [Look at China through Numbers: 
Criminal Cases and Nonguilty Cases in the SPC’s Annual Report Since 1983], SOHU BOKE 
(搜狐博客) [SOHU BLOG] (Mar. 20, 2012), http://yeyuduxingzhe.i.sohu.com/blog/view/208173345.ht
m (arguing that the nonguilty rate is a measure of courts’ independence and noting that since 2009 
the Supreme People’s Court has stopped disclosing the number of people found not-guilty in its 
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may reduce a sentence on appeal to time served. For example, in one case the 
intermediate court initially remanded a conviction for illegal manufacture of 
explosives. On appeal from the trial court for a second time, the court reduced 
the sentence from seventy-two to twenty-one months, effectively the time 
already served.233 
Some cases in which evidence against the defendant is weak are never 
resolved. One Henan lawyer described a case that was vacated and sent back for 
retrial twice. The lower court never reheard the case; instead, the defendant was 
released on bail and no further action was taken in the case.234 Another lawyer 
stated that defendants prevail with nonguilty arguments only when they are 
already on bail or in cases filed by private parties (as opposed to the 
procuratorate).235 Other concerns also impact courts’ reluctance to issue 
nonguilty verdicts: judges may be worried about protests from victims’ families 
in cases in which they issue not guilty verdicts,236 may be concerned that judges 
may be blamed if the procurator files an objection to the decision resulting in the 
verdict being changed,237 or may be concerned about potential State 
compensation claims from the acquitted defendant.238 
Lawyers also note that it is often hard to contest guilt because many 
defendants have confessed prior to the intervention of lawyers.239 In such cases, 
lawyers who pursue a nonguilty defense risk being targeted for prosecution 
under Article 306 of China’s Criminal Law. Lawyers have no space to make 
independent assessments of the merits of a nonguilty defense because their 
clients have generally already been pressured into acknowledging their guilt.240 
As one lawyer commented, “once you are at court it is too late.”241 Lawyers 
 
annual Work Report); Morang “Wuzui Panjue” Qinzhou Jiancha Jiguan Shenpan Jiandu 
(莫让”无罪判决”掣肘检察机关审判监督) [Don’t Let “Nonguilty Decisions” Circumvent 
Procuratorate Supervision], ZHONGGUO CAIXUN WANG (中国财讯网) [CAIXUN] (Jul. 10, 2012) (on 
file with author) (noting procuracy concerns that a nonguilty verdict will affect their evaluation and 
will have negative social effects); Chehui Gongsu Zai Woguo Lifa Ji Sifa Shiwu Zhong De 
Zhuangkuang (撤回公诉在我国立法及司法实务中的状况) [The Situation of Withdrawal of 
Prosecution in Legislation and Adjudication in Our Nation], FAZHI WANG (法制网) [LEGAL DAILY] 
(Oct. 6, 2008), http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/fxy/content/2008-06/10/content_875885.htm (stating 
that any case in which a court proposes to find a defendant nonguilty must be submitted to court 
adjudication committees, that courts will consult with procuratorates in advance of any such 
decision, and that procuratorates will in practice withdraw a case prior to a court issuing a nonguilty 
decision). 
 233.  Case I75a. Defendants had argued that they did not know how the fertilizer they were 
grinding would be used. The court found they were merely accessories to the crime. 
 234.  Interview 2012-6. 
 235.  Interview 2012-28. 
 236.  Id. 
 237.  Id. 
 238.  Interview 2012-10. 
 239.  Interview 2012-7. 
 240.  Id. 
 241.  Id. 
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also say they need to be careful in criminal cases to avoid becoming potential 
targets of criminal sanctions themselves.242 They thus rarely present new 
evidence or seek out additional evidence; doing so is too dangerous.243 The 
general environment for lawyers is also widely viewed as having deteriorated in 
recent years, making lawyers less likely to take on difficult criminal cases.244 
Constraints on lawyers likely also increase the pressure on defendants to agree 
to settlements. 
Yet there were also a few cases in which lawyers appeared to mount 
spirited defenses. In one case, a defendant was sentenced to thirteen years for 
theft of 90,000 yuan from an office during a break-in. On appeal of a second 
trial in the case, the defendant’s lawyer argued that the defendant’s confession 
resulted from torture and stated that the court should follow the presumption of 
innocence. The court rejected the argument, affirming the sentence, arguing that 
the defendant showed no physical evidence of torture.245 In another case, a 
lawyer argued, unsuccessfully, that his client was denied access to counsel in the 
trial court.246 
There is substantial debate about the effectiveness of hiring lawyers, both 
in China generally and in Henan. Lawyers and academics note that procurators 
and judges will sometimes threaten defendants with longer sentences if they hire 
a lawyer, will pressure defendants to settle cases absent a lawyer rather than 
going to trial,247 or will offer lighter sentences if the accused do not hire a 
lawyer.248 As one lawyer noted, lawyers make procurators’ jobs harder, and 
procurators are likely to try to dissuade defendants from hiring lawyers in 
complex or problematic cases.249 Some judges likewise say that hiring lawyers 
can sometimes result in worse outcomes for defendants.250 
Yet lawyers also argue that they can add value by arguing for leniency and 
facilitating negotiations with courts and procuratorates.251 Lawyers state that in 
serious cases, pleading for leniency (rather than contesting guilt) can mean the 
difference between life and death.252 In contrast, judges argue that lawyers are 
not as important to courts as are institutional dynamics in affecting outcomes. 
As one judge explained, judges are already under enormous pressure to avoid 
 
 242.  Interview 2012-20. 
 243.  Interview 2013-2. 
 244.  Interview 2012-28. 
 245.  Case I18A. 
 246.  See Case I41a. In that case, the intermediate court said that the defendant had clearly 
stated that she did want to be represented by a lawyer. The woman was convicted of threatening a 
victim and her parents after her son allegedly committed rape.  
 247.  Interview 2012-1. 
 248.  Interview 2012-7. 
 249.  Interview 2012-28. 
 250.  Interview 2012-11. 
 251.  Interview 2012-5. 
 252.  Interview 2012-5; Interview 2013-4.  
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incorrect decisions; lawyers’ arguments thus play a marginal role in affecting 
how courts handle cases.253 Yet other judges noted that lawyers can be helpful 
in persuading their clients to settle cases. As one judge noted, parties often do 
not trust judges. Lawyers therefore can be useful in persuading parties to 
settle.254 
In Henan, as elsewhere in China, lawyers continue to find it extremely 
difficult to access their clients.255 It is common, say lawyers, to be denied even 
the limited access to their clients permitted under the 1996 Criminal Procedure 
Law.256 Local authorities largely ignore the provisions in the Lawyers Law that 
grant additional access, with some detention facilities in Henan posting signs 
that explicitly state that they follow the Criminal Procedure Law and not the 
Law on Lawyers, which prior to 2013 gave lawyers increased access to their 
clients compared to the Criminal Procedure Law.257 Conversations between 
clients and lawyers are monitored: as one lawyer noted, the most important role 
of lawyers “is to comfort” their clients.258 Likewise lawyers comment that it 
remains extremely difficult for them to access witnesses or documentary 
evidence.259 A nonparty witness appeared to testify in court in only one case in 
the dataset. All other cases that involved witness testimony in court were cases 
in which the witness was also a victim seeking compensation. 
 
 253.  Interview 2012-19. 
 254.  Id. 
 255.  For a general discussion of the challenges facing criminal defense lawyers, see generally 
Sida Liu & Terence C. Halliday, Political Liberalism and Political Embeddedness: Understanding 
Politics in the Work of Chinese Criminal Defense Lawyers, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 831, 839–44 
(2011). 
 256.  Interview 2012-20; Interview 2012-28. 
 257.  Interview 2012-7. Prior to the 2012 revision of China’s Criminal Procedure Law, a 
conflict existed between article 33 of the Lawyers Law (adopted in 2007) and article 96 of the 
Criminal Procedure Law (adopted in 1996). The Criminal Procedure Law originally provided access 
to a client only after the procuratorate brought formal charges; in contrast the revised Lawyers Law 
granted access as soon as a defendant was subject to any compulsory measure. The Lawyers Law 
also provided that lawyers could meet defendants without being monitored; the 1996 Criminal 
Procedure Law stated that authorities could monitor such meetings. Revisions to Criminal Procedure 
Law and the Lawyers Law in 2012 made the two laws consistent, largely adopting the prior 
provisions of the Lawyers Law. Du Feijin et al., Weile Gongzheng Gaoxiao He Quanwei 
(为了公正高效和权威) [For Fairness, Efficiency, and Authority], RENMIN FAYUAN BAO (人民法院报) 
[PEOPLE’S COURT NEWS] (Oct. 9, 2012), http://rmfyb.chinacourt.org/paper/html/2012-
10/09/content_51765.htm (detailing the prior conflict between the Criminal Procedure Law and the 
Lawyers Law); Yuan Dingbo, Lüshi Fa Yu Xingshi Susong Fa Chongtu Cheng Yixie Difang Ban’an 
Jiguan Huxiang Tuiwei Liyou (律师法与刑事诉讼法冲突成一些地方办案机关互相推诿理由) [Conflict 
between Lawyers Law and Criminal Procedure Law Has Become Local Authorities’ Excuse for 
Shirking Responsibilities], FAZHI RIBAO (法制日报) [LEGAL DAILY] (May 26, 2009), 
http://fzzx.gansudaily.com.cn/system/2009/05/31/011115445.shtml (detailing problems in 
implementing provisions in the Lawyers Law governing access of lawyers to their clients while in 
detention). 
 258.  Interview 2012-28. 
 259.  Id. 
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F. Appeals and Rehearings 
Outcomes of appeals to the intermediate court suggest that the court is far 
more active in reviewing lower court decisions than is commonly assumed to be 
the case of appellate courts in China. Yet the cases also confirm many of the 
widely recognized problems that exist with appellate review of criminal cases. A 
total of 442 defendants appealed to the intermediate court in 2010 or had their 
cases appealed by the procuratorate or victims. Of these, 86 had their cases 
vacated and remanded for trial, 28 had their sentences lowered, and 3 had their 
sentences increased. An additional 10 defendants had no change to their 
sentence but had civil compensation claims either remanded or revised.260 
Taken together, the cases suggest that the intermediate court is adjusting 
outcomes or remanding cases for retrial in nearly one-third of the cases. This 
figure is far higher than is commonly assumed to be the case in criminal cases in 
China or the estimate of ten to twenty percent given in interviews.261 
Many cases involved appeals by multiple parties, including victims 
(plaintiffs in civil compensation cases) and the procuratorate. Table 9 lists the 
total number of defendants who had their cases appealed, by party filing the 
appeal. Table 10 sets forth outcomes on appeal. 
TABLE 9: APPEALS FILED BY DEFENDANTS, VICTIMS, AND PROCURATORATE 
Party Bringing the Appeal Number Percent of 
Total 
Defendant 254 57.5 
Plaintiff (Victim) 32 7.2 
Procuratorate 9 2.0 
Defendant and Plaintiff (Victim) 35 7.9 
 
 260.  See, e.g., Case I65 (affirming sentence but increasing compensation to victim’s family). 
 261.  Interview 2012-19; see also “Tongyi Ershen Gaipan Biaozhun” De Diaoyan Baogao 
(统一二审改判标准”的调研报告) [Report on Unifying the Standard for Adjusting and Remanding 
Appeals], GUANGDONG FAYUAN WANG (广东法院网) [GUANGDONG COURT NET] (Mar. 20, 2012), 
http://www.gdcourts.gov.cn/gdcourt/front/front!content.action?lmdm=LM53&gjid=2012032002223
7085591 (reporting that nationwide between 2005 and 2007 on average 14% of appeals were 
adjusted and 7.1% were remanded); Woguo Wunian Lai Gong 90,000 Yu Jian Xingshi Ershen Anjian 
Bei Yifa Gaipan Huo Fahui Chongshen (我国五年来共9万余件刑事二审案件被依法改判或发回重审) 
[90,000 Criminal Appeal Cases Were Adjusted or Remanded During the Past Five Years], XINHUA 
WANG (新华网) [XINHUA NEWS NET] (Oct. 26, 2008), http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-
10/26/content_10254795.htm (reporting that between 2003 and 2008, 90,000 out of 470,000 
criminal appeal cases were adjusted or remanded in China); Guangzhou Zhongyuan Xing Erting 
Xingshi Ershen Anjian Gaipan, Fahui Chongshen Qingkuang Fenxi 
(广州中院刑二庭刑事二审案件改判、发回重审情况分析) [Analysis of Remanded and Changed Cases 
in Guangzhou Intermediate Court Second Criminal Division], ZHONGGUO XINGSHI FALÜ WANG 
(中国刑事法律网) [CHINA CRIMINAL LAW NET], http://www.lw315.com/ShowArticle.shtml?ID=201
013121312166297.htm (reporting that between 2002 and 2004, Guangzhou Intermediate Court 
adjusted 11.48% and remanded 2.75% of 1054 criminal appeals). 
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Defendant and Procuratorate 9 2.0 
Plaintiff (Victim) and Procuratorate 1 0.2 
Defendant, Plaintiff (Victim) and 
Procuratorate 
1 0.2 
Not applicable 101 22.9 
Total 442 100 
Note: “Not applicable” reflect cases with multiple defendants where one or more 
defendants did not appeal. In cases where multiple defendants did appeal, all 
defendants that appealed were counted in the “Defendant” row. In cases 
concerning multiple defendants where the procuratorate appealed, the 
“Procuratorate” row reflects the number of defendants for whom the 
procuratorate launched the appeal. 
TABLE 10: OUTCOMES ON APPEAL (SECOND INSTANCE DEFENDANTS ONLY) 




Affirmed 244 55.2 
Vacated and remanded for retrial 87 19.7 
Reduced the criminal sentence 28 6.3 
Increased the criminal sentence 3 0.7 
Changed the applied law but sentence affirmed 5 1.1 
Criminal case affirmed but the attached civil 
compensation case vacated and remanded for 
retrial 
6 1.4 
Criminal case affirmed but attached civil 
compensation amount increased 
3 0.7 
Reversed (Defendant acquitted) 1 0.2 
Not applicable 65 14.7 
Total defendants 442 100 
Note: “Not applicable” refers to circumstances where a case had multiple 
defendants, one or more of whom did not appeal. As a result, the trial verdict 
against these defendants was effectively unchanged. This number is lower than 
the number of defendants coded as “not applicable” in Table 9: Appeals Filed by 
Defendants, Victims, and Procuratorate because in certain appeal decisions, 
particularly those where the criminal case was vacated and remanded, defendants 
who did not appeal benefited from the appeal of their codefendant. 
As is standard practice in appellate review in China, court decisions 
vacating and remanding lower court judgments never stated the specific reasons. 
Instead, appellate decisions indicate only whether the problem was with the 
evidence (generally by stating that the “evidence was unclear”), the procedure, 
or the application of law. The majority of the decisions remanding cases in my 
dataset simply stated that “the facts are unclear.” Appellate courts often, but not 
always, follow up such decisions with either an internal, nonpublic letter to the 
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lower court regarding the specific problems in the case or with a telephone call 
that explains the reason for reversal.262 
As noted above, many of the cases in which the intermediate court changed 
outcomes on appeal were modest changes to civil compensation claims attached 
to criminal cases. Judges note that the largest category of cases that are changed 
on appeal arise from settlements reached after the conclusion of the first-
instance trial.263 Seven appellate decisions made explicit reference to the 
payment of compensation as a basis for a reduction in sentence on appeal.264 
Other cases changed on appeal involved defendants who paid fines or restitution 
subsequent to the original sentence.265 
Changes on appeal are not always in favor of defendants. Indeed, appealing 
can in some cases be dangerous for defendants. In one intermediate court case, 
the defendants were charged with illegal manufacture and sale of explosives.266 
Defendants appealed a county court judgment imposing sentences of ten and 
four years on the two primary defendants; the procuratorate did not appeal. The 
appellate court vacated and remanded the decision. On retrial the case was 
assigned to a different court, which increased the sentences to twelve and ten 
years. The appellate court then affirmed.267 
Appellate courts may also impose longer punishments than those imposed 
in the trial court in response to an appeal by the procuratorate or in a retrial, or 
zaishen proceedings. Sixteen of the appellate cases explicitly involved kangsu, 
or “objections,” filed by the procuratorate either alone or alongside an appeal 
filed by a defendant or victim challenging a compensation award. In eight of 
these cases only the procuratorate appealed. The intermediate court increased 
 
 262.  Interview 2012-19. 
 263.  Interview 2012-19. 
 264.  Cases I156, I1d, I133, I144a, I79, I83, and I13b. In Case I79 the reference was indirect: 
the court noted that subsequent to the original court decision, the victim forgave the defendant and 
withdrew her civil claim. Case 179. The lower court had ordered defendant to pay 3255 yuan in 
compensation, but the defendant’s family subsequently paid 14,000 yuan. Id. The victim then 
requested that the court treat the defendant leniently. See also Case I35 (vacating and remanding 
decision in traffic-accident case after lower court imposed three-year sentence despite settlement of 
civil compensation claim and the fact defendant took victim to the hospital following the accident). 
Sometimes the adjustment is minor. See Case I13b (demonstrating a minor adjustment where 
defendant had a prior record, reducing sentence from 210 months to 204 months on appeal following 
the payment of compensation).  
 265.  See, e.g., Case I19. In that case, defendant paid a fine and returned stolen goods after a 
conviction in county court; the appellate court reduced the sentence from two years and three months 
to fifteen months, exactly the time already served. 
 266.  Case I49. 
 267.  Although Article 190 of the 1996 Criminal Procedure Law stated that an appellate court 
could not increase a defendant’s sentence absent an appeal filed by a procuratorate, the restriction 
did not apply to first-instance courts retrying a defendant following a reversal and remand. The 2012 
Criminal Procedure Law removes this loophole, stating that on remand a trial court may only 
increase a sentence where the procuratorate brings new criminal charges. 2012 Criminal Procedure 
Law, supra note 6, art. 226.  
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the defendant’s sentence in three of these eight cases, affirmed the decision in 
three cases, and vacated and remanded the remaining two cases to the trial court. 
In all three cases in which the intermediate court increased a sentence its 
reasoning was exactly in line with the procuratorate’s argument. Thus, for 
example, the intermediate court increased a defendant’s sentence from six to 
twelve months for the crime of concealing 18,000 yuan in stolen property; the 
court stated that the original sentence was “inappropriate.”268 In a child 
trafficking case the intermediate court imposed a five-year sentence on a 
defendant who had received only a suspended sentence at trial.269 
Judges say that many kangsu petitions come at the request of victims or 
their families who object to the sentence but who cannot directly appeal the 
sentence.270 Under the 1996 Criminal Procedure Law, victims could appeal a 
compensation award in their status as plaintiffs in an attached civil 
compensation case but could not appeal the actual sentence; the same is true 
under the 2012 Criminal Procedure Law. One of the objections filed by the 
procuratorate was in direct response to complaints from the victim’s family: the 
court increased a sentence from thirteen to fifteen years for a defendant who 
killed another man in a fight. The court noted that the defendant failed to 
compensate the victim’s family and did not “obtain the family’s forgiveness,” 
and thus the sentence in the lower court was too light.271 In an additional three 
cases involving four defendants, the intermediate court vacated and remanded 
lower court decisions following a procuratorate objection to the lower court 
decision.272 One such case was a rare lower court acquittal of a defendant in an 
intentional injury case. The intermediate court remanded, finding the facts 
unclear, following an objection to the sentence from the procuracy and an appeal 
of the failure to award compensation by the victim.273 Although not technically 
an acquittal, another remand occurred in a case in which the lower court had 
imposed no prison sentence on a defendant convicted of fraud.274 
 
 268.  Case I3b. 
 269.  Case I29. The court found that the defendant had not merely purchased trafficked 
children, but had actually engaged in trafficking. Another case was heard via retrial procedures at the 
request of the procuratorate (who apparently had failed to file an appeal on time). The court agreed 
to increase a sentence from thirty months to thirty-six months for a recidivist defendant convicted of 
stealing electric bicycles. Case I4b. The procuratorate’s successful argument noted that the sentence 
imposed in the lower court was below the range set forth in the criminal law. 
 270.  In some locations procuratorates may also be required to file a certain number of kangsu 
each year. Lin Shiyu (林世钰), Jiancha Yewu Kaoping Jizhi Ying Fuhe Sifa Guilüu 
(检察业务考评机制应符合司法规律) [Procuratorial Kaoping Should be Consistent with the Law], 
JIANCHA RIBAO (检察日报) [PROCURATORATE DAILY] (Nov. 23, 2008), http://www.spp.gov.cn/site2
006/2008-11-24/0003421232.html (China). 
 271.  Case I21. It is unclear why the procuratorate charged the defendant with willful injury 
rather than homicide, although the fact that the defendant attacked the victim after the victim 
harassed the defendant’s daughter (forcing her to urinate in front of him) likely played a role. 
 272.  Cases I21b, I43b, and I97a (two separate defendants).  
 273.  Case I43b.  
 274.  Case I97a. In this case, the court imposed a fine of 50,000 yuan. A codefendant, who 
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Yet given the widespread portrayal of Chinese courts largely complying 
with the procuracy in criminal cases, the four cases275 in which the intermediate 
court rejected the objection filed by the procuratorate were perhaps more 
noteworthy. In one case, the procuratorate objected to a lower court’s imposition 
of a suspended sentence for a coal company official prosecuted for 
misappropriating 100,000 yuan in public funds; the intermediate court affirmed 
without a hearing, stating that the procuratorate lacked evidence to support its 
argument.276 Other cases in which the intermediate court refused a procuratorate 
objection requesting a higher sentence involved the theft of a Tang Dynasty 
Buddha, an intentional injury case arising out of a knife fight at a mahjong 
game,277 and a complex case in which the procuratorate and defendant both 
appealed after a defendant was found guilty of misappropriation of public funds 
and tax evasion.278 In the final case, the procuratorate argued that the defendant 
should have been convicted of the more serious crime of corruption. The 
defendant had used public funds to start a company; he then returned the money 
and sold the company. The defendant also appealed, arguing that the sentence 
was too harsh because he had acted on the instruction of the company board. It 
is difficult to draw any conclusions from the cases as to why the procuratorate 
failed in these cases, in particular whether any of the defendants had particularly 
strong cases or sources of external support that might have affected court 
determinations. 
Sixty-nine cases involved appeals by victims or their families. Although 
victims may only appeal compensation awards, many victims contested both 
compensation amounts and the sentence.279 In three cases victims succeeded in 
receiving additional compensation through an appellate court judgment. 
Eight of the cases in my appellate dataset involved appellate review of a 
case for at least the second time. Lawyers say such cases generally are those in 
which courts have discovered problems with lower-court decisions but are 
unwilling to issue a nonguilty verdict.280 Some of the cases clearly represent 
attempts to avoid decisions being classified as incorrect. Thus, for example, the 
 
received a suspended sentence and a fine, likewise had his case remanded.  
 275.  Cases I13, I7b, I8e, and I20a. 
 276.  Case I13. In this case, the defendant also appealed, suggesting perhaps that the 
procuratorate’s objection was in part an effort to prevent a reduction in sentence.  
 277.  The defendant had already compensated the victims, thus perhaps explaining the court’s 
reluctance to increase the sentence. 
 278.  Case I20A. In the original trial the defendant was sentenced to five years.  The 
procuratorate objected, the court vacated and remanded, and the trial court retried defendant and 
imposed an eight year sentence. The procuratorate and defendant then both appealed. The defendant 
argued that he was not guilty of misappropriation because he had acted on the instruction of the 
company board. The procuratorate argued that that defendant had used public funds to start a 
company and thus should have been convicted of the more serious crime of corruption.   
 279.  See, e.g., Case I43b (vacating and remanding compensation award, but stating that the 
court cannot reconsider the sentence).  
 280.  Interview 2012-6. 
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intermediate court twice remanded for retrial the conviction of the boss of a 
State-owned hotel for abuse of power after he entered into an allegedly 
unauthorized contract resulting in massive losses. In the third trial in the county 
court the defendant was again convicted, but the court imposed no punishment. 
In a third appeal the intermediate court affirmed.281 Other cases reflected 
ongoing disputes concerning compensation; in one case in which the 
compensation amount was the only issue in dispute, the court remanded the 
same lower court decision three times.282 In another case the appellate court 
ordered that the lower court try a case for the fifth time, despite the fact that the 
defendants had already served three-year sentences.283 Other cases were 
reopened many years after the conviction—including one for a defendant who 
was convicted of fraud in 1983 and served an eight-year sentence. The 
defendant, who never appealed the original sentence, apparently successfully 
petitioned the provincial high court to order a rehearing. The intermediate court 
did so but, applying the law of the 1980s, affirmed.284 
In one of the stranger cases in the dataset, a defendant originally arrested in 
1990 on charges of intentional injury for an alleged killing in a fight fled after 
being detained. He was eventually arrested in 2001 and then tried and acquitted 
in 2002 by the trial court. The victim’s family apparently appealed the attached 
civil compensation case and the intermediate court ordered a retrial of both the 
criminal judgment and the civil case, something it was not permitted to do 
absent the initiation of formal rehearing procedures. By this point the defendant 
had been found nonguilty and had skipped town. He was located in 2008, 
eighteen years after the incident, and retried and sentenced to eight years. Both 
the defendant and the procuratorate appealed, and the appellate court again 
vacated and remanded. In 2010, twenty years after the alleged crime, the trial 
court tried the defendant for a third time (and a codefendant for a second time) 
and increased his sentence to nine years. On appeal for the third time the 
intermediate court affirmed, with the primary defendant receiving a nine-year 
sentence and the second defendant receiving a suspended sentence.285 
Judges estimate that they hear appeals in only ten percent of cases.286 This 
reflects that generally hearings are held on appeal only in cases involving an 
objection filed by the procuratorate, where a hearing must be held, or in major 
 
 281.  Case I26. 
 282.  The third remand was because the lower court had impermissibly assigned the case on 
retrial to the same three judges who initially tried it. Case I57. The reasons for the prior two remands 
were unclear. See id.  
 283.  Case I16a. The four retrials apparently came after repeated petitioning by the defendants. 
Three of the retrials came after successful appeals. One came after a successful petition for 
rehearing.  
 284.  Case I16b. 
 285.  Case I86. 
 286.  Interview 2012-19. 
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cases. The data are consistent with such estimates: only eight percent of the 
appeals indicated that the courts held hearings. 
Defendant’s arguments on appeal largely focused on leniency. The 
inclusion of new evidence on appeal is rare; as one lawyer commented, “who 
would dare to do it?,” a reference to the risk of prosecution for fabricating 
evidence.287 
G. Roles of Individual Judges 
Participants in trials in the county court, not surprisingly, were repeat 
players. In the county court a relatively small number of judges presided over 
the overwhelming majority of cases. A total of seven judges and one people’s 
assessor heard all of the cases.288 A single judge, sitting alone, tried 64 
defendants and three-judge panels tried 169 cases. One judge participated, either 
alone or as part of a panel, in the trials of 172 of the 273 defendants. Two of the 
three judges were the same for 145 of the defendants. A people’s assessor, who 
is not considered a judge, sat on panels for 40 of the 273 defendants. The same 
people’s assessor was involved in all of these cases. The people’s assessor 
participated in many of the more serious crimes, perhaps reflecting an attempt to 
suggest that the court was soliciting public input in such cases. 
H. Predecision Detention and Bail 
The county court held 169 of the 273 defendants in pretrial detention at 
some point, for periods ranging from 2 days to 369 days. The average detention 
period, prior to a decision, was 39 days. But some defendants were held for 
comparatively long periods prior to the decision. In four separate cases, 5 
defendants were detained for 300 or more days prior to decision. All of these 
cases involved relatively complex cases involving large amounts of money. The 
issuance of false value added tax invoices and fraud or contract fraud. 
Of the 273 defendants in the county court, 166 were granted bail, including 
75 who were granted bail after initially being detained. Only 8 of the bailed 
defendants eventually received nonsuspended criminal sentences.289 This 
suggests that the decision to grant bail is a strong predictor of whether or not a 
defendant will face incarceration after trial. Of the remaining bailed defendants, 
1 received no sentence or fine, but nevertheless was convicted; 39 received fines 
but no criminal sentence;290 51 received fines and a suspended sentence; and 67 
 
 287.  Interview 2012-6. 
 288.  People’s assessors are laypeople, often former cadres or teachers, who are selected to hear 
cases alongside judges in some cases.  
 289.  Defendants in Cases B20 (two of three defendants), B62, B66 (three of eleven 
defendants), B67, B69, and B128 all received nonsuspended sentences. One of the defendants in 
Case B23 received a six-year sentence suspended for twelve months, making for an effective 
sentence of five years. 
 290.  Three of the fined defendants were also sentenced to public surveillance. Another was 
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received a suspended sentence but no fine. Although the defendants that were 
granted bail were charged with a wide range of crimes, the largest categories of 
bailed defendants were those sentenced for traffic offenses, willful injury, 
concealing criminal gains, and illegal logging. Although the court judgments do 
not provide information regarding a defendant’s residence, in interviews judges 
note that only local residents receive bail.291 Likewise, generally a defendant 
must agree to compensate a victim as a prerequisite to being granted bail. 292 
Not surprisingly, defendants in cases appealed to or tried in the 
intermediate court were generally detained far longer.293 Defendants in first-
instance trials, for which data were available, averaged 367 days in detention 
prior to decision. Defendants in appeals were detained for shorter periods—215 
days—but nevertheless far longer than defendants in the county court. 
Defendants whose cases were on review in the intermediate court for the second 
time, or for more than the second time, were detained for an average of 411 
days.294 
III.  
IMPLICATIONS AND ANALYSIS 
The empirical analysis presented above provides insights into criminal 
justice in China that was largely missing from prior scholarship. This section 
discusses the implications of the above analysis in four areas of empirical and 
theoretical literature. 
A. Methodology and Empirical Findings 
Many of this article’s findings will not be surprising to scholars familiar 
with the Chinese legal system. Scholars are widely aware of the lack of lawyers, 
prevalence of confessions, and near impossibility of winning a nonguilty verdict 
in China. Nevertheless, this study offers some of the first empirical evidence of 
just how widespread such phenomena continue to be. This article confirms 
findings that have been based on observational studies of and interviews in 
courts, or based on research conducted prior to the recent reemphasis on 
populism in China’s legal system. The lack of access to earlier cases makes it 
impossible to compare 2010 to prior years. Qualitative evidence from 
interviews, however, suggests that such problems persist even as China embarks 
 
sentenced to public surveillance but then had the sentence suspended. 
 291.  Interview 2013-11. 
 292.  Id. 
 293.  The intermediate court cases did not always include complete information on detention 
periods, in particular for cases on appeal. As a result, these figures may not be representative. The 
cases provide data on predecision detention periods for 56 of the 73 first-instance defendants, 223 of 
the 452 defendants on appeal, and 13 of the 21 defendants in cases heard in rehearing procedures. 
Defendants in rehearing procedures on average had been detained for 243 days. 
 294.  The cases provide information on six of the eight defendants in such cases.  
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on its most important criminal-justice-system reforms in more than fifteen years 
with the enactment and implementation of the 2012 revisions to the Criminal 
Procedure Law.295 Likewise, the lack of access to prior decisions makes it 
difficult to determine to what degree making opinions public affects the quality 
and substance of court decisions. Nevertheless, this study offers a baseline 
against which future developments can be measured. The data also provide a 
narrative of ordinary criminal justice in rural China as well as insight into 
institutional dynamics within the criminal justice system. 
Some of the discussed data, however, are surprising. Recent literature has 
described the policy of balancing leniency and severity or has focused on 
specific cases of individuals purchasing leniency by compensating victims. Prior 
literature has neglected how leniency is manifest across a range of cases. 
Evidence from court decisions and from interviews with lawyers and judges 
suggests that settlement and compensation to victims are playing far greater 
roles in the criminal justice system than previously recognized in routine 
criminal matters and in serious cases.296 I lack access to capital cases, and thus 
am unable to observe the most serious cases that most often do not receive 
leniency. Yet, it is clear that in a wide range of cases leniency in the wake of 
confessions and settlement is a common incentive to efficiently resolve criminal 
matters. The scope of the use of suspended sentences in the county court and the 
apparent use of settlement to reduce sentences in cases tried in the intermediate 
court at the very least represent a liberal interpretation of the SPC’s guidelines. 
This Article’s findings thus challenge common Western assumptions about 
the Chinese criminal justice system, in particular the focus on heavy 
punishments. The findings provide empirical support for those in China who 
argue that wealth is becoming a key determinant in criminal sentencing. I do not 
claim that the system is always lenient; the system can treat defendants 
extraordinarily harshly, in particular when the State considers its interests 
threatened. A decision that appears lenient may in fact be excessive if it results 
from court doubts about the guilt of the defendant. The cases also manifest a 
strong State interest in maintaining control by criminalizing minor disputes or 
those that present a threat to social stability. But my findings suggest that more 
attention should be paid to developments in routine cases and that leniency is 
used even in some serious cases. 
 
 295.  Participants at workshops in China and interviewees noted that some recent legal changes 
are already having a significant effect, most notably amendments to the Criminal Law in 2010 that 
mandate a term of detention for defendants convicted of drunk driving and also heightened focus on 
official corruption in the wake of China’s 2012 leadership transition. Interview 2013-8; Interview 
2013-9; Criminal Law, supra note 89, art. 133(a).  
 296.  For example, McConville’s important study found that only eleven percent of defendants 
in basic court cases received noncustodial sentences. MCCONVILLE, supra note 3, at 363–64. One 
earlier study found that eighty-four percent of defendants received a prison sentence and that sixty-
four percent received a sentence in excess of five years. Hong Lu & Terance D. Miethe, Confessions 
and Criminal Case Disposition in China, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 549, 571 (2003).  
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This Article also makes the methodological claim that there is significant 
value in studying the vast volume of routine cases now publicly available in 
China. I am well aware of the limitations of my data and of the risks of Western 
scholars over-relying on court opinions. Numerous cases in this Article leave 
one to speculate regarding likely machinations at work behind the scenes. The 
ability to read the entire case files would certainly add to our understanding of 
how courts process criminal cases. Scholars in China are now doing some work 
in this area.297 But the cases available in Henan provide a new window into the 
practice of justice in China, one that has yet to be explored in depth by scholars 
in China or elsewhere. The hundreds of thousands of cases available are a 
massive untapped resource for scholars, both for learning what is actually going 
on in the Chinese legal system and for mapping out future lines of scholarly 
inquiry. Most prior scholarship on China’s courts, including my own, relies 
heavily on either what judges say they do or on cases selected for researchers by 
judges. The widespread availability of large numbers of opinions allows us to 
compare what judges say they do with what actually happens. 
More can be done with the data presented in this article. Future work will 
include more sophisticated quantitative analysis and also more detailed analysis 
of particular types of cases. It is now possible to examine issues such as the 
effect of lawyers on outcomes in criminal cases and perhaps the role of 
individual judges. Related projects based on this study are likely to include a 
more detailed analysis of how judges interpret and adapt national laws, judicial 
interpretations, and policy guidelines; analysis of how courts process a wide 
range of financial crimes, including corruption; the use of nondeath sentences 
for homicide; the impact of the relationship among victims and defendants on 
outcomes; the role and meaning of confession; the role of appellate review and 
whether certain types of cases are more likely to succeed on appeal; and 
potentially the impact of gender and family relations on the criminal justice 
system. 
B. Leniency and the Roles of Chinese Criminal Law 
As noted above, the definition of leniency is contested in China. Leniency 
in sentencing in China can be manifest through formal law, judicial policy, and 
actual practice. Chinese law and court guidelines provide technical answers to 
when and how courts should act leniently, setting forth conditions under which a 
defendant may have a sentence reduced or may receive a suspended sentence. 
My analysis suggests another definition, focusing on when individuals are able 
to avoid jail time, in relatively minor cases, or avoid death, in more serious 
cases. 
 
 297.  McConville’s study also relied in part on analysis of case files conducted by members of 
his research team. MCCONVILLE, supra note 3, at 363–64. 
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It is counterintuitive to discuss leniency when referring to a system with 
virtually no chance of acquittal at trial and in which wrongful convictions are 
common. Not everyone receives leniency, and victims play an important role in 
determining whether leniency is granted. Nevertheless, policy and practice in 
Henan suggest that many defendants are receiving sentences that are lower than 
what is likely or even possible under formal legal rules and might otherwise be 
expected. My claim that courts are surprisingly lenient should be understood 
narrowly to state that the data show a surprisingly large number of cases 
(compared to popular and scholarly expectations)298 in which defendants 
receive only suspended sentences or receive life or suspended death sentences 
for murder. 
The practice of leniency also provides insight into the goals of the Chinese 
criminal justice system. The evidence presented in this Article suggests that the 
policy of leniency is not being used to protect defendants’ rights or to further an 
interest in restorative justice. In contrast to most models of restorative justice, 
negotiations between victims and defendants appear to influence charging 
decisions and court determinations regarding guilt. Courts place extreme 
pressure on the parties to reach negotiated outcomes, often guiding the parties to 
such outcomes, and reconciliation focuses overwhelmingly on financial 
payments. Negotiations in China take place in the context of a system that has 
no real mechanism for protecting the rights of defendants and in which money 
and stability concerns play a large role in determining outcomes. 
Resource concerns are one factor leading to greater use of suspended 
sentences. China has seen a significant increase in the number of criminal cases 
in the past decade, from 656,788 in 2000 to 884,737 in 2010.299 The growth in 
cases makes continuation of “strike hard” policies both impracticable and also 
perhaps risky. Such policies risk alienating a widening segment of the 
population. Yet resource concerns do not appear to be a main factor. Instead, the 
primary goals in embracing leniency are to maintain State legitimacy, ensure 
social stability, insulate the courts from criticism, and protect individual judges 
from responsibility for potentially incorrect decisions. In interviews, judges 
 
 298.  In discussing this project with numerous distinguished Chinese criminal justice scholars, I 
have been struck that virtually all have been surprised at the prevalence of suspended sentences in 
routine cases. Likewise, participants at presentations of this paper in China expressed surprise; one 
judge stated that my findings were “impossible.” Yet the findings were also confirmed with judges 
in county B, one of whom stated that nonpublic juvenile cases would show even more surprising 
levels of leniency. Interview 2013-9. It is clear there is widespread variation in the frequency with 
which suspended sentences are granted, both within Henan and nationwide. Data are difficult to 
obtain. One workshop participant estimated that suspended-sentence rates in one major city in Henan 
would not exceed thirty percent. There has been less surprise at my finding that compensation can 
make a difference between life and death in more serious cases.  
 299.  See ZHONGGUO FALÜ NIANJIAN (2001) [LAW YEARBOOK OF CHINA (2001)] 1256, 1258; 
ZHONGGUO FALÜ NIANJIAN (2011) [LAW YEARBOOK OF CHINA (2011)] 1051, 1053. 
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repeatedly noted that mediated and settled cases are much less likely to result in 
petitions, protests, or appeals than are ordinary criminal matters.300 
The strong emphasis on compromise in the cases also suggests that courts 
are focused less on the legal correctness of their decisions than on ensuring 
cases be resolved. Evidence from Henan suggests that courts’ jobs today focus 
less on determining the guilt of the defendant and more on preventing social 
instability. Trials determine only sentences, not guilt. The cases reviewed also 
demonstrate that procurators and courts have extreme discretion when it comes 
to bringing charges and imposing sentences.301 Although there is a technical 
legal basis for most lenient (and harsh) outcomes, the cases show just how wide 
this discretion can be in determining the crime charged, as demonstrated in the 
corruption and financial crime cases, and the sentences imposed.302 Efforts to 
make the criminal justice system more rule-based are in tension with the 
extensive discretion that judges and procurators possess. Yet, this discretion is 
an important tool for encouraging negotiated outcomes. Whether the 
inconsistency that results from such discretion poses a challenge to the 
legitimacy of the criminal justice system remains to be seen. 
It is also clear from the data that the criminal justice system is not serving 
the interests of the State alone. In contrast with the traditional characterization of 
people in rural China avoiding contact with the formal legal system, my data 
suggest it has become routine for the criminal system to be utilized to settle 
disputes among strangers (traffic accidents) and among neighbors and family 
(fights). The large number of what appears to be primarily tort disputes reflects 
the weakness of the tort system. Litigants, prosecutors, and judges use criminal 
charges strategically to force settlements or to ensure that tort judgments are 
paid. There is also evidence that the criminal system is being used to settle 
scores, in particular in the context of financial crimes. Evidence from Henan 
suggests that much of the victims’ rights discourse that dominates discussions of 
criminal settlement in China may be glossing over the potential use of the 
criminal system for personal animus. This is made possible by the fostering of 
 
 300.  China is certainly not the only system that treats a large range of defendants leniently; 
Japan’s incarceration rates are also very low. Routine cases in many U.S. jurisdictions likely would 
appear lenient to many outside observers. Nor is China the only place in which bargaining is a key 
aspect of the resolution of criminal disputes, although parallels to plea bargaining (and the resulting 
low number of nonguilty verdicts) in the United States should not be overstated. Negotiations in 
China rarely include lawyers, and victims have extraordinary power in the process. China has 
undergone a shift from a traditional authoritarian law-and-order approach to criminal cases; as 
recently as eighteen years ago it was possible for defendants to be executed for theft. Yet it also 
seems clear that the Chinese system is not converging toward either the Japanese model or Western 
liberal systems that put heavy emphasis on procedure. 
 301.  The fact that procurators face incentives to obtain convictions, but not to achieve specific 
sentences, also encourages flexibility and leniency. 
 302.  Prosecutors elsewhere, including the United States, often have extensive discretion in 
changing decisions. In China, however, such discretion is exercised with little or no subsequent 
oversight from the courts.  
220
Berkeley Journal of International Law, Vol. 33, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/bjil/vol33/iss1/1
LIEBMAN PDF (DO NOT DELETE) 6/6/2015  3:03 AM 
216 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 33:1 
direct negotiations between the parties prior to a court hearing a case. One key 
question that the cases raise, but do not answer, is why traditional community-
based institutions for dispute resolution do not function. Another is whether the 
desirability of a system that relies so heavily on settlement varies depending on 
the crime charged. For example, whether there is a difference between an 
emphasis on settlement in traffic and fight cases compared to corruption cases. 
The emphasis on mediated outcomes may reflect both China’s legal history 
and also changes in contemporary Chinese society. Aspects of the practice have 
clear historical antecedents.303 At the same time, however, the heavy emphasis 
on settlement may reflect trends in contemporary Chinese society. All of 
Chinese society has become an exchange, in which money and personal 
relationships dominate outcomes. 
The evidence presented in this Article represents a modest first step toward 
creating a theory of the practice of ordinary criminal law in China. The State 
continues to focus on law and order as a mechanism for maintaining legitimacy 
and for maintaining control. This is evidenced by the heavy punishments in 
cases affecting State interests and the extreme discretion placed in the hands of 
police and procurators. Yet the data in this Article also suggest other themes that 
appear to be increasingly important in criminal cases in China. Such values 
include repairing social ties; maintaining social harmony; and ensuring 
compensation to victims, in particular those who have lost a key breadwinner in 
a society lacking a social safety network.304 The Chinese system also provides 
minor criminals with a second and final chance; reinforces communal norms, 
even when those norms are in tension with formal law (as appears to be the case 
in family disputes and the one bigamy case); and introduces elements of 
collective punishment by ensuring that family members and neighbors bear the 
financial cost of crime.305 
China appears to be shifting toward a bifurcated criminal justice system. 
Routine cases are resolved through negotiated outcomes and suspended or result 
in short sentences, while more serious cases result in long sentences. A key 
insight from the data presented in this Article is that defendants may wind up in 
the second category not only because of the seriousness of their crime but also 
because of their inability to settle or the victims’ unwillingness to settle. The 
data also make clear that there is significant randomness with regards to who 
gets punished and how much punishment they receive. Flexibility on the part of 
 
 303.  Involving another person in the legal system was a common means of retaliation in 
traditional China. The use of money to reduce sentences was also common. Because China’s 
imperial legal system did not distinguish between civil and criminal disputes, it was also common to 
see disputes that today might be classified as civil disputes being resolved through the use of 
criminal sanctions.  
 304.  As one lawyers noted, the system may make sense for China given that victims generally 
lack resources and can be financially crippled by the loss of a breadwinner. Interview 2013-2. 
 305.  In rural areas it is common for family members of defendants to rely on neighbors to 
come up with the money necessary to pay a settlement. Interview 2013-2. 
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procurators and police and the apparent randomness of outcomes may further 
State interests in social control by sending a message that all are subject to the 
State’s power. 
Most debate within China focuses on technical issues directly linked to 
specific reforms: eliminating torture, increasing access to lawyers, and forcing 
appellate courts to decide cases before them when they find problems (not 
simply engaging in repeated cycles of vacating and remanding problematic 
decisions). The cases described above, however, suggest that more fundamental 
issues, concerning the core goals of Chinese criminal law, are contested as well. 
Understanding the reality of every day criminal justice in China provides a first 
step to conceptualizing the goals of Chinese criminal justice. Evidence from 
Henan suggests that the focus of Chinese criminal law in China has shifted away 
from a focus on incarceration and control. The criminal system today mixes 
emphasis on legal principles with quick resolution of disputes, compensation for 
victims, observance of community norms, and reliance on high levels of 
discretion by decision makers. 
C. The (D)evolving Roles of China’s Courts 
This Article’s findings also contribute to literature on the role of China’s 
courts and the evolution of institutions in an authoritarian system in which 
stability is prioritized above all else. The observation that courts are innovating 
and adopting flexible practices not entirely consistent with formal laws in order 
to minimize discontent and insulate themselves from criticism is not unique to 
criminal cases.306 I have recently written of a similar phenomenon in medical 
disputes,307 and other scholars have noted similar trends in other areas. Recent 
scholarship notes the emphasis on mediation in recent years in civil cases and 
the focus in the courts on anjie, shiliao—deciding the case and resolving the 
dispute.308 Henan’s bar to posting mediated cases online provides an additional 
incentive for courts to mediate cases, as judges know such cases will not be 
publicly scrutinized. 
The trends this Article describes in Henan show how such policies have 
extended to criminal cases. Authorities believe that mediating or compelling 
settlements in criminal disputes will reduce threats to social stability, most 
significantly the threat of protest or petitioning.309 Specifically, mediated 
outcomes prevent victims (or their families) from protesting sentences they view 
 
 306.  In some jurisdictions in China judges may be evaluated both on whether or not a decision 
is reversed or vacated and also on whether or not there is an appeal at all.  
 307.  Benjamin L. Liebman, Malpractice Mobs: Medical Dispute Resolution in China, 113 
COLUM. L. REV. 181 (2013). 
 308.  Liebman, supra note 9; Minzner, supra note 8. 
 309.  For a more detailed discussion of stability concerns, see Benjamin Liebman, Legal 
Reform: China’s Law-Stability Paradox, DAEDALUS, Spring 2014, at 96. 
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as too light and prevent defendants’ families from objecting to sentences viewed 
as excessive. 
In contrast with the social worker model of adjudication emphasized in 
literature in the United States, however, the primary concern of China’s courts 
appears to be problem elimination, not problem solving. Hence, courts appear 
not only to compel settlement, but also to implicitly and explicitly threaten those 
who do not comply with such settlements, as evidenced by cases that target 
repeat petitioners. The State is also taking an active role in resolving what we 
might otherwise think of as private, civil disputes that appear to indirectly affect 
State interests. Resolution of such cases appears to be based less on efforts to 
meet social expectations or impose community norms, and more on a functional 
focus on eliminating disputes. 
China appears to be seeking to use courts to create a “no loser” model, 
where the focus on outcomes, not procedure (or law), leads all parties to accept 
negotiated outcomes. In this system, failure to do so is an indication that courts 
are not doing their job. The conflict between this approach and the adoption of a 
rule-based system has been widely noted in China, with many arguing that such 
moves undermine China’s efforts to construct a legal system. 
The encouragement of State-mediated (or coerced) settlements may be 
particularly troubling in the criminal sphere. The promotion of negotiated 
outcomes marks a sharp departure from recent efforts to create a more 
adversarial system. The emphasis on settlement introduces a new element of 
coercion into the system.310 The focus on negotiated outcomes reinforces the 
fact that courts are not a forum for determining guilt. 
Equity concerns are also readily apparent. Although most criticism of 
China’s embrace of settlement and mediation in the criminal context has focused 
on serious crimes—where defendants in effect purchase their life311—my data 
suggest similar concerns in the imposition of sentences in routine cases. This 
Article shows not only that some defendants are receiving strikingly lenient 
sentences but also that defendants who either refuse or lack the ability to pay 
may be punished harshly. Whether negotiated outcomes actually produce 
stability is unclear. Criminal cases continue to be a primary source of complaints 
concerning the courts, in particular from victims’ families’ reported concern that 
defendants will avoid punishment through back-room deals. 
The data also show that courts are willing to assert their authority in some 
cases. One of the most surprising findings is the high rate of reversal or changes 
to decisions on appeal to the intermediate court. This rate is much higher than 
generally understood to be the case within the legal community or rates reported 
in most prior research and in the official media. Yet this high rate of reversal is 
not limited to this one court or to criminal cases; I have also noted a high rate of 
 
 310.  Rosenzweig et al. report similar findings and provide additional details regarding the 
coercive nature of criminal mediation. Rosenzweig et al., supra note 102, at 29–31. 
 311.  For example, see Lewis, supra note 85, at 329, discussing equity concerns in capital cases. 
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reversal in medical malpractice cases in courts elsewhere in China.312 Some of 
the changes and reversals almost certainly reflect attempts to appease particular 
parties, or to encourage further settlement. But it also seems clear that the 
intermediate court is taking its role in reviewing cases seriously. In some cases, 
institutional relationships and the fear of a case being labeled an error result in a 
dynamic in which the appellate and basic-level courts are locked in a standoff. 
Cases are remanded only to have lower courts issue the same or a similar 
decision at retrial. This finding contrasts with those who have argued that 
appellate review in China has little effect, or that higher courts are generally 
unwilling to reverse lower court decisions because of the impact such decisions 
have on the career development of judges below. Likewise, the cases show that 
courts, in certain cases, will challenge and reject procuratorate determinations or 
arguments on appeal. Imposing lenient sentences may also allow courts to 
disagree with procuratorates without issuing a nonguilty verdict. Increased 
oversight over the courts appears to be making judges more careful and less 
willing to sign off on clearly incorrect cases. 
Future research will provide insight into the interplay between the adoption 
of formal law (the revised Criminal Procedure Law) and new procedural 
requirements and continued concerns about stability and emphasis on settling 
cases. The new law should in theory result in numerous changes readily 
apparent in case decisions. Procurators are now required to attend all trials, 
something clearly not done in many cases handled via summary procedures in 
my dataset. Appellate courts will be required to decide more cases on appeal (as 
opposed to remanding them). Additionally, witnesses should begin to attend 
trials. Many of these provisions in the new law are based on the assumption that 
the system is shifting toward an adversarial model of adjudication and impartial 
determination of guilt by judges. The evidence presented in this Article shows 
how far the current reality is from this model, and thus highlights the challenges 
facing attempts to implement the new law. 
Henan’s experiment with judicial transparency also provides insight into 
innovation in China’s courts. Henan’s reforms have resulted in part from 
attempts to address widely publicized egregious cases of injustice. They also 
reflect the personal goals of Zhang Liyong, the president of the Henan High 
People’s Court. Innovation has helped to boost Zhang’s profile. It remains to be 
seen to what degree his reforms will outlive his time on the court. Henan’s 
innovations, the most important in China’s courts in the past decade, were not 
designed to increase judicial power. Innovative steps were part of an attempt to 
make the courts function more efficiently and make fewer errors, and in so 
doing win greater popular support. Legitimacy for the courts does appear to be a 
goal, but it is legitimacy rooted in meeting popular expectations, avoiding 
instability, and serving the interests of the State. 
 
 312.  Liebman, supra note 307, at 220. 
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The fact that judges in China play roles different from those played by their 
Western counterparts has long been observed in academic literature, as has the 
growing tension between judges’ own aspirations regarding their roles and the 
actual roles they play. I have argued elsewhere that many of the roles being 
played by Chinese courts today represent a continuation of revolutionary and 
prerevolution tradition rather than a shift against efforts to build some form of 
liberal rule-of-law system. This Article shows how these trends manifest 
themselves in the criminal justice system, where judges balance efforts to 
resolve disputes with their own self-interest in avoiding responsibility for 
mistakes. The cases studied also provide insight into the roles lawyers play in 
such a system, with most focusing on technical arguments for leniency and on 
facilitating negotiated outcomes. Substantive arguments not relating to leniency 
are almost entirely unsuccessful. The cases thus provide an initial window into 
an as yet understudied topic: the role of lawyers in a system in which compelled 
mediation is dominant. 
D. Authoritarian Transparency 
Finally, this project also adds to literature about the role of transparency in 
the Chinese political system and authoritarian systems more generally. In some 
respects, the courts in Henan today are the most transparent in China.313 Yet this 
transparency has very specific goals: controlling judges, reducing errors, and, in 
so doing, increasing public confidence in the courts. The fact that so much 
continues to go on behind the scenes makes the efficacy of such efforts at the 
very least questionable.314 Most notably, however, is the parallel to other areas 
in which the State has similarly embraced an instrumentalist view of 
transparency. Such areas include the adoption of freedom-of-information 
regulations and the “controlled transparency” model of media supervision of the 
legal system.315 Absent from discussion of the Henan policy of making cases 
available online is concern with citizens’ right to know. Likewise, discussion of 
the policy does not focus on the possibility that making vast amounts of 
information publicly available may also play a role in furthering the 
development of the Chinese legal system. Instead, official discussion focuses 
almost entirely on the need to ensure judges obey the rules. 
Henan’s experiment with judicial openness highlights three characteristics 
of China’s emerging model of authoritarian transparency. First, transparency is 
targeted, and it is applied to limited areas and with specific constraints. This is 
 
 313.  Publication of cases is not the only possible metric of judicial transparency: the cases tell 
us little about whether trials were actually open to the public. 
 314.  For example, the Henan cases provide no insight into the rule of court adjudication 
committees or Party Political legal committees. For a discussion of the general functioning of the 
courts, see Benjamin Liebman, China’s Courts: Restricted Reform, 191 CHINA Q. 633 (2007). 
 315.  Benjamin Liebman, Watchdog or Demagogue? The Media in the Chinese Legal System, 
105 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 125 (2005). 
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evident from the limitations on publication of a range of types of cases, arguably 
some of which would provide the best window into courts’ performance in the 
most difficult cases. Second, transparency appears to be directed mainly at 
curbing official wrongdoing, not empowering individuals. This is true both in 
the courts and in media coverage of official corruption. Third, appeals to 
transparency are combined with appeals to populism. As Zhang Liyong noted, 
putting cases online is intended to subject judges to scrutiny by the online 
masses. Transparency is aimed at scaring judges into better performance and 
creating a platform for State oversight, with populism playing a functional role 
in supporting such goals. 
Henan’s experiment is of particular relevance now, as the SPC seeks to 
encourage and require courts nationwide to place decisions online. Yet the 
SPC’s new rules also highlight some of the apparent uncertainty among court 
and Party-State leaders about the utility of transparency. The SPC rules will 
require the Henan courts to make some decisions publicly available that were 
not previously made available under Henan’s own rules on publication of court 
documents. Yet in one crucial respect the SPC rules will reduce transparency in 
Henan.316 The SPC rules state that court decisions may only be posted online 
when case decisions are “effective”—meaning either that the time period for 
filing an appeal has passed, or an appellate court has decided the case.317 Prior 
to the SPC rules, Henan required publication of first-instance decisions even 
when they were pending on appeal.318 Henan court officials note that this is no 
longer permitted. The ban on publication of decisions on appeal suggests 
discomfort with the possibility of public scrutiny of pending cases. Scrutiny is 
permitted only once courts have reached a definitive outcome. Transparency is 
being used for specific purposes, but is also being controlled. 
The near-daily corruption scandals in China in the past two years show that 
increased transparency and public scrutiny are not easily contained. New 
technologies are combining with increased focus by the State on attacking 
corruption to provide fertile ground for individuals and activists alike to expose 
wrongdoing. Yet this dynamic supports, rather than undermines, this model of 
authoritarian transparency, in significant part because such efforts are not rule 
(or law) based. Those who are exposed receive little in the way of legal process, 
and those not exposed fear online exposure or popular reaction rather than 
sustained compliance with legal rules. There is value in increased transparency 
in the Chinese system, but there is also danger in mistaking such steps with 
fundamental change in how the system functions. Transparency may be a virtue, 
but it is also a tool of control. 
 
 316.  Interview 2014-1 (stating that “less will be made public under [the] SPC rules” than had 
previously been the case in Henan). 
 317.  See sections 2, 4, and 8 of Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on the Issuance of 
Judgments on the Internet by the People’s Courts, supra note 5. 
 318.  Implementing Rules, supra note 13, arts. 3, 5, 6 (stating that all first-instance cases, 
except for those specifically excluded, shall be placed online). 
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CONCLUSION 
This Article is a first step in taking advantage of the vast amount of data 
now available to scholars of Chinese law regarding court decisions. This Article 
is also an initial step toward conceptualizing what such data mean for our 
understanding of the Chinese criminal justice system and for broader trends in 
the Chinese political-legal system. What remains most surprising is that such 
research is now possible, in large part due to Party-State interests in asserting 
oversight over China’s courts. 
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